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Belief Dispersion in the Stock Market
ADEM ATMAZ and SULEYMAN BASAK∗
ABSTRACT
We develop a dynamic model of belief dispersion with a continuum of investors dif-
fering in beliefs. The model is tractable and qualitatively matches many of the em-
pirical regularities in a stock price, its mean return, volatility, and trading volume.
We find that the stock price is convex in cash-flow news and increases in belief dis-
persion, while its mean return decreases when the view on the stock is optimistic,
and vice versa when pessimistic. Moreover, belief dispersion leads to a higher stock
volatility and trading volume. We demonstrate that otherwise identical two-investor
heterogeneous-beliefs economies do not necessarily generate our main results.
JEL Classifications: D53, G12.
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The empirical evidence on the effects of investors’ dispersion of beliefs on asset prices and their
dynamics is vast and mixed. For example, several works find a negative relation between belief
dispersion and a stock mean return (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), Chen, Hong, and
Stein (2002), Goetzmann and Massa (2005), Park (2005), Berkman et al. (2009), Yu (2011)).
Others argue that the negative relation is only valid for stocks with certain characteristics (e.g.,
small, illiquid, worst-rated or short sale constrained) and in fact, find either a positive or no
significant relation (Qu, Starks, and Yan (2003), Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2006), Avramov
et al. (2009)). Existing theoretical works (discussed below), on the other hand, do not provide
satisfactory answers for these mixed results.
In this paper, we develop a tractable model of belief dispersion which is able to qualita-
tively match many of the empirical regularities in a stock price, its mean return, volatility,
and trading volume. Towards that, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model popu-
lated by a continuum of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) investors who differ in their
(dogmatic or Bayesian) beliefs and consume at a single consumption date. There are two key
differences between our model and existing works, which typically employ two investors and
a continuum of consumption dates. First, rather than considering the overall effects of belief
heterogeneity, we isolate the effects of belief dispersion from the effects of other moments and
conduct comparative statics analysis with respect to belief dispersion only, resulting in sharp
results. Second, because of a continuum of investors in our model, no investor dominates the
economy in relatively extreme states, leading to a non-vanishing belief dispersion, and hence
to simple uniform behavior for economic quantities. Moreover, dynamic models with hetero-
geneous beliefs are generally hard to solve for long-lived assets beyond logarithmic preferences
(e.g., Detemple and Murthy (1994), Zapatero (1998), Basak (2005)), nevertheless our model
delivers fully closed-form expressions for quantities of interest.1
In our analysis, we summarize the wide range of investors’ beliefs by two sufficient measures,
the average bias and dispersion in beliefs, and demonstrate that equilibrium quantities are
driven by these two key endogenous variables. We take the average bias to be the bias of
the representative investor whereby how much an investor’s belief contributes to the average
bias depends on her wealth and risk attitude. Investors whose beliefs get supported by actual
cash-flow news become relatively wealthier through their investment in the stock, and therefore
contribute more to the average bias. This leads to fluctuations in the average bias so that
following good (bad) cash-flow news, the view on the stock becomes relatively more optimistic
1We explicitly obtain all quantities of interest in closed-form in all the economic settings considered in the
paper, with the exception of trading volume in the multiple-stocks setting of Section V.
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(pessimistic). On the other hand, consistently with empirical studies, we construct our belief
dispersion measure as the cross-sectional standard deviation of investors’ disagreement which
also enables us to reveal its dual role. First, we uncover a novel role of belief dispersion in
that it amplifies the average bias so that the same good (bad) news leads to more optimism
(pessimism) when dispersion is higher. Second, we show that belief dispersion indicates how
much the average bias fluctuates, and therefore measures the extra uncertainty investors face.
Turning to our model implications, we first find that in the presence of belief dispersion the
stock price is convex in cash-flow news, indicating that the stock price is more sensitive to news
in relatively good states. It also implies that the increase in the stock price following good
news is more than the decrease following bad news, as supported by empirical evidence (Basu
(1997), Xu (2007)). Convexity arises because, the better the cash-flow news, the higher the
extra boost for the stock price coming from elevated optimism. Consequently, the stock price
increases with belief dispersion when the view on the stock is relatively optimistic, and decreases
otherwise, also consistent with empirical evidence (Yu (2011)). Our model also implies that
the stock price may increase and its mean return may decrease in investors’ risk aversion in
relatively bad states. This is because in a more risk averse economy investors have less exposure
to the stock which limits the wealth transfers to pessimistic investors in bad times, leading to a
relatively optimistic view on the stock, hence to a higher stock price and a lower mean return.
We next examine the widely-studied relation between belief dispersion and a stock mean
return. Since dispersion represents the extra uncertainty investors face, risk averse investors
demand a higher return to hold the stock when dispersion is higher. However, dispersion also
amplifies optimism and pushes up the stock price further following good news leading to a
lower mean return in those states. When the view on the stock is relatively optimistic, the
second effect dominates and we find a negative dispersion-mean return relation. As discussed
earlier, empirical evidence on this relation is mixed, with some studies finding a negative while
others finding a positive or no significant relation. Our model generates both possibilities and
demonstrates that this relation is negative when the view on the stock is relatively optimistic,
and positive otherwise. Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) provide supporting evidence to
our finding by documenting an optimistic bias in their study overall, and by also showing that
the negative effect of dispersion becomes stronger for more optimistic stocks. A similar evidence
is also provided by Yu (2011).
We further find that the stock volatility increases monotonically in belief dispersion, consis-
tent with empirical evidence (Ajinkya and Gift (1985), Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2005),
Banerjee (2011)). This is because the average bias in beliefs fluctuates more, and hence so does
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the stock price, when belief dispersion is higher. In addition to belief dispersion, the investors’
Bayesian learning process also increases the fluctuations in the average bias, and hence leads
to a higher stock volatility. This occurs because all investors become relatively more optimistic
(pessimistic) following good (bad) news due to belief updating. Our closed-form stock volatility
expression allows us to disentangle the respective effects of belief dispersion and Bayesian learn-
ing, and yields a novel testable implication that Bayesian learning induces less stock volatility
when belief dispersion is higher. Moreover, we find that the stock trading volume is also in-
creasing in belief dispersion, consistently with empirical evidence (Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift
(1991), Bessembinder, Chan, and Seguin (1996), Goetzmann and Massa (2005)). This finding
is intuitive since when dispersion is higher, investors with relatively different beliefs, who also
have relatively higher trading demands, are more dominant. We also find a positive relation
between the stock volatility and trading volume due to the positive effect of dispersion on both
quantities, also supported empirically (Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992), Banerjee (2011)).
We further demonstrate that most of our results discussed above do not necessarily obtain
in an otherwise identical economy to ours but populated by two rather than a continuum of
investors. In particular, we show that in this economy, the stock price is no longer convex in
cash-flow news across all states of the world, and a higher belief dispersion can actually lead to a
lower stock volatility and trading volume in some states of the world. This happens because in
this economy, unlike in our model, belief heterogeneity effectively vanishes in relatively extreme
states, since the pessimistic investor eventually controls almost all the wealth in the economy
in very bad states, and the optimistic investor in very good states. The transition from the
states in which belief heterogeneity is prevalent to the relatively extreme states in which belief
heterogeneity vanishes generates irregular behavior for economic quantities across states of the
world. Finally, we generalize our main model with a single stock to one with multiple stocks, on
which investors have different beliefs. We demonstrate that all our main results and underlying
economic mechanisms still go through in this more elaborate economy. We also provide an
extension of our main model with a single stock payoff and a consumption date to feature
multiple stock payoffs and consumption dates (Internet Appendix ID), where we demonstrate
that our main insights remain valid, though the equilibrium characterization becomes more
complex.
Our methodological contribution and the tractability of our model is in large part due to
a continuum of investor types having a Gaussian distribution. This assumption follows from
the recent works by Cvitanic´ and Malamud (2011) and Atmaz (2014). Cvitanic´ and Malamud
focus on the survival and portfolio impact of irrational investors and do not characterize the
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investor belief heterogeneity, and consequently express the equilibrium quantities, in terms of
average bias and dispersion in beliefs as we do, while Atmaz does, but employs logarithmic
preferences and focuses on short interest.
The literature on heterogeneous beliefs in financial markets is vast. One strand of this lit-
erature examines the relation between belief dispersion and stock mean return and typically
finds this relation to be positive (Abel (1989), Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2005), David
(2008), Banerjee and Kremer (2010)). On the other hand, Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) and
Johnson (2004) establish a negative relation by imposing short selling constraints for certain
type of investors and considering levered firms, respectively. Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin
(2013) develop a credit risk model and show that an increasing heterogeneity of beliefs has
a negative (positive) effect on the mean return for firms with low (high) leverage. However,
this result does not hold for unlevered firms. Differently from these works, we show that the
dispersion-mean return relation is negative when the view on the stock is relatively optimistic
and positive otherwise. Moreover, in this literature, David (2008) shows that belief heterogene-
ity leads to a non-monotonic relation between the mean return and investors’ risk aversion.
We compliment David by providing the additional insight that the relation between the mean
return and risk aversion depends on the level of the optimism/pessimism on the stock, and is
non-monotonic only when the view is relatively pessimistic, but it is monotonic otherwise.
Another strand in the literature examines the impact of belief heterogeneity on stock volatil-
ity and typically finds a positive effect (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Buraschi and Jiltsov
(2006), Li (2007), David (2008), Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), Banerjee and Kremer
(2010), Andrei, Carlin, and Hasler (2015)). Yet another strand in this literature employs be-
lief dispersion models to explain empirical regularities in trading volume. Early works include
Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995). This strand also includes works that
find a positive relation between belief dispersion and trading volume, as in our work (Varian
(1989), Shalen (1993), Cao and Ou-Yang (2008), Banerjee and Kremer (2010)). Even though
our paper differs from each one of these works in several aspects, one common difference is that
none of them generate the stock price convexity as in our model.2
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature on parameter uncertainty and Bayesian
2Other works studying the effects of heterogeneous beliefs in financial markets include Basak (2000, 2005),
Kogan et al. (2006), Jouini and Napp (2007), Yan (2008), Xiong and Yan (2010), Zapatero (1998). Additionally,
more general works study the effects of heterogeneous beliefs in the presence of other investor heterogeneities,
including Cvitanic´ et al. (2012), Bhamra and Uppal (2014) (risk aversion and time preference), Chabakauri
(2015) (risk aversion and various portfolio constraints), Chabakauri and Han (2015) (risk aversion and non-
pledgeable labor income), Detemple and Murthy (1997) (short-selling and borrowing constraints), Gallmeyer
and Hollifield (2008) (short-selling constraints), Osambela (2015) (funding constraint).
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learning. In this literature, Veronesi (1999) and Lewellen and Shanken (2002) show that learn-
ing leads to stock price overreaction, time-varying expected returns and higher volatility. In
particular, Veronesi shows that the stock price overreaction leads to a convex stock price.3
Timmermann (1993, 1996), Barsky and De Long (1993), Brennan and Xia (2001), Pa´stor and
Veronesi (2003) show that learning increases volatility and generates predictability for stock
returns. However, differently from our work, all these works employ homogeneous investors se-
tups, and therefore are not suitable for studying the effects of belief dispersion. The works that
study the effects of parameter uncertainty and Bayesian learning with heterogeneous beliefs
include Nakov and Nun˜o (2015) and Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2017). These
works show that the learning bias among young and old investors leads to booms and busts
in stock prices, long-run return predictability and variations in price-dividend ratios. These
results are primarily driven by the standard mechanism of Bayesian updating in the presence
of parameter uncertainty, which is also present in our analysis with Bayesian learning, where
investors become optimistic (pessimistic) after a sequence of positive (negative) shocks. How-
ever, these works employ discrete-time settings and rely on numerical solutions for their results,
in contrast to our continuous-time setting leading to analytical results.
Section I presents the main model, Section II analyzes the average bias and dispersion in
beliefs, and Section III provides our results on the stock price, its dynamics and trading volume.
Section IV presents two-investor economy, Section V the multi-stock economy, and Section VI
our main model with Bayesian learning. Section VII concludes. Appendix A contains the proofs
of the main model, Appendix B discusses the parameter values employed in Figures. Internet
Appendix IA contains the proofs of the two-investor economy, IB the proofs of the multi-stock
economy, IC the proofs of the main model with Bayesian learning, ID provides an extension of
our analysis that features multiple stock payoffs and consumption dates.
I. Economy with Dispersion in Beliefs
We consider a simple and tractable pure-exchange security market economy with a finite
horizon evolving in continuous time. The economy is assumed to be large as it is populated by
a continuum of investors with heterogeneous beliefs and standard CRRA preferences. In the
3In Veronesi (1999) the stock price convexity arises due to parameter uncertainty and the learning process,
whereas in our model the convexity follows from the stochastic average bias in beliefs and obtains even when
there is no parameter uncertainty and learning. Relatedly, Xu (2007) develops a model in which the stock price
is a convex function of the public signal. However, in his model no-short-sales constraints are needed to obtain
this result.
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general specification of our model, investors optimally learn over time in a Bayesian fashion.
However, to highlight that our results are not driven by parameter uncertainty and learning,
we first consider the economy when all investors have dogmatic beliefs. The richer case when
investors update their beliefs over time is relegated to Section VI where we show that all our
results hold in this more complex economy. Moreover, to demonstrate our main economic
mechanism and results as clearly as possible, we first consider economies with a single risky
stock. The generalization to the more elaborate economy with multiple stocks is undertaken in
Section V, where we again show that all our main predictions remain valid.
A. Securities Market
There is a single source of risk in the economy which is represented by a Brownian motion
ω defined on the true probability measure P. Available for trading are two securities, a risky
stock and a riskless bond. The stock price S is posited to have dynamics
dSt = St [µStdt+ σStdωt] , (1)
where the stock mean return µS and volatility σS are to be endogenously determined in equi-
librium. The stock is in positive net supply of one unit and is a claim to the payoff DT , paid at
some horizon T , and so ST = DT . This payoff DT is the horizon value of the process Dt with
dynamics
dDt = Dt [µdt+ σdωt] , (2)
where D0 = 1, and µ and σ are constant, and represent the true mean growth rate of the
expected payoff and the uncertainty about the payoff, respectively. The process Dt represents
the arrival of news about DT , and hence we refer to it as the cash-flow news. Moreover, this
cash-flow news process can be mapped into the analyst forecasts about the long-term earnings
growth rates, as we discuss in Appendix B. The bond is in zero net supply and pays a riskless
interest rate r, which is set to 0 without loss of generality.4
B. Investors’ Beliefs
There is a continuum of investors who commonly observe the same cash-flow news process
D (2), but have different beliefs about its dynamics. The investors are indexed by their type θ,
4Since in this setting consumption can occur only at time T (i.e., no intermediate consumption), the interest
rate can be taken exogenously. Our normalization of zero interest rate is for expositional simplicity and it is
commonly employed in models with no intermediate consumption, see, for example, Pa´stor and Veronesi (2012)
for a recent reference.
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where a θ-type investor agrees with others on the stock payoff uncertainty σ but believes that
the mean growth rate of the expected payoff is µ+ θ instead of µ. This allows us to interpret a
θ-type investor as an investor with a bias of θ in her beliefs. Consequently, a positive (negative)
bias for an investor implies that she is relatively optimistic (pessimistic) compared to an investor
with true beliefs. Under the θ-type investor’s beliefs, the cash-flow news process has dynamics
dDt = Dt [(µ+ θ) dt+ σdωt (θ)] ,
where ω (θ) is her perceived Brownian motion with respect to her own probability measure Pθ,
and is given by ωt (θ) = ωt − θt/σ. Similarly, the risky stock price dynamics as perceived by
the θ-type investor follows
dSt = St [µSt (θ) dt+ σStdωt (θ)] , (3)
which together with the dynamics (1) yields the following consistency relation between the
perceived and true stock mean returns for the θ-type investor
µSt (θ) = µSt + σSt
θ
σ
. (4)
The investor type space is denoted by Θ and it is taken to be the whole real line R to
incorporate all possible beliefs including the extreme ones and to avoid having arbitrary bounds
for investor biases. We assume a Gaussian distribution with mean m˜ and standard deviation
v˜ for the relative frequency of investors over the type space Θ. A higher m˜ (v˜) implies that
initially there are more investors with relatively optimistic (large) biases. This specification
conveniently nests the benchmark homogeneous beliefs economy with no bias when m˜ = 0
and v˜ → 0. Moreover, this assumption ensures that the investor population has a finite (unit)
measure and admits much tractability, and can be justified on the grounds of the typical investor
distribution observed in well-known surveys.5 We further assume that all investors are initially
endowed with an equal fraction of stock shares. Since a group of investors with the same beliefs
and endowments are identical in every aspect, we represent them by a single investor with
the same belief and whose initial endowment of stock shares is equal to the relative frequency
of that group. This simplifies the analysis and provides the following initial wealth for each
5See, for example, the Livingston survey and the survey of professional forecasters conducted by the Philadel-
phia Federal Reserve. Generally, the observed distributions are roughly symmetric, single-peaked and assign less
and less people to the tails, resembling a Binomial distribution for a limited sample. For a large economy, these
properties can conveniently be captured by our Gaussian distribution assumption, which also follows from the
recent works by Cvitanic´ and Malamud (2011) and Atmaz (2014) in dynamic settings as discussed in Introduc-
tion. So¨derlind (2009) also invokes this assumption but in a single-period static model, and obtains implications
that are different from ours, since ours are much driven by the dynamic interactions between economic quantities
as we demonstrate in the ensuing analysis.
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distinct θ-type investor
W0 (θ) = S0
1√
2piv˜2
e−
1
2
(θ−m˜)2
v˜2 , (5)
where S0 is the (endogenous) initial stock price.
C. Investors’ Preferences and Optimization
Each distinct θ-type investor chooses an admissible portfolio strategy φ (θ), the fraction of
wealth invested in the stock, so as to maximize her CRRA preferences over the horizon value
of her portfolio WT (θ)
Eθ
[
WT (θ)
1−γ
1− γ
]
, γ > 0, (6)
where Eθ denotes the expectation under the θ-type investor’s subjective beliefs Pθ, and the
financial wealth of the θ-type investor Wt (θ) follows
dWt (θ) = φt (θ)Wt (θ) [µSt (θ) dt+ σStdωt (θ)] . (7)
In this setting investors’ preferences are over the horizon value of their wealth/consumption
rather than intermediate consumption, which would otherwise endogenize the interest rate in
equilibrium. As the previous literature highlights, the presence of belief heterogeneity may
have important effects on the interest rate in the economy (e.g., Detemple and Murthy (1994),
David (2008)). However, in this paper, our focus is not on the interest rate, but on the marginal
effects of belief dispersion on risky stocks, and as we demonstrate in Section 6.2, we can still
calibrate our model and quantify these effects even though the interest rate is exogenous.
II. Equilibrium in the Presence of Belief Dispersion
To explore the implications of belief dispersion on the stock price and its dynamics, we first
need a reasonable measure of it. In this Section, we define belief dispersion in a canonical way,
to be the standard deviation of investors’ biases in beliefs. Using the cross-sectional standard
deviation of investors’ disagreement as belief dispersion is also consistent with the commonly
employed belief dispersion measures in empirical studies.6 However, for this, we first need to
6See, for example, Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), Johnson (2004), Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu
(2006), Sadka and Scherbina (2007), Avramov et al. (2009) who employ the standard deviation of levels in
analysts’ earnings forecasts, normalized by the absolute value of the mean forecast. Anderson, Ghysels, and
Juergens (2005), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007), Yu (2011) employ the standard deviation of (long-
term) growth rates in analysts’ earnings forecasts as the measure of belief dispersion. Since we define ours as the
standard deviation of investors’ biases, our belief dispersion measure is similar to those used in the latter works.
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determine the average bias in beliefs from which the investors’ biases deviate. The average bias
is defined to be the bias of the representative investor in the economy. We then summarize
the wide range of investors’ beliefs in our economy by these two variables, the average bias
and dispersion in beliefs, and determine their values in the ensuing equilibrium. As we also
demonstrate in Section III, the equilibrium quantities are driven by these two key (endogenous)
variables, in addition to those in a homogeneous beliefs economy. Moreover, specifying the belief
dispersion this way enables us to isolate its effects from the effects of other moments and conduct
comparative statics analysis with respect to it only.
Equilibrium in our economy is defined in a standard way. The economy is said to be
in equilibrium if equilibrium portfolios and asset prices are such that (i) all investors choose
their optimal portfolio strategies, and (ii) stock and bond markets clear. We will often make
comparisons with equilibrium in a benchmark economy where all investors have unbiased beliefs.
We refer to this homogeneous beliefs economy as the economy with no belief dispersion.
DEFINITION 1 (Average bias and dispersion in beliefs): The time-t average bias in beliefs,
mt, is defined as the implied bias of the corresponding representative investor in the economy.
Moreover, expressing the average bias in beliefs as the weighted average of the individual
investors’ biases
mt =
ˆ
Θ
θht (θ) dθ, (8)
with the weights ht (θ) > 0 are such that
´
Θ
ht (θ) dθ = 1, we define the dispersion in beliefs,
vt, as the standard deviation of investors’ biases
v2t ≡
ˆ
Θ
(θ −mt)2 ht (θ) dθ. (9)
The extent to which an investor’s belief is represented in the economy depends on her wealth
and risk attitude. In our dynamic economy, the investors whose beliefs are supported by the
actual cash-flow news become relatively wealthier. This increases the impact of their beliefs in
the determination of equilibrium prices. Our definition of the average bias in beliefs captures
this mechanism by equating it to the bias of the representative investor who assigns more weight
to an investor whose belief has more impact on the equilibrium prices. Finding the average bias
this way is similar to representing heterogeneous beliefs in an economy by a consensus belief as
in Rubinstein (1976), and more recently in Jouini and Napp (2007).7
As Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007) argue, there are several advantages of using the standard deviation
of growth rates rather than of levels as a measure of belief dispersion, since the timing of the forecasts affect
levels but not growth rates, and since growth rates are easily comparable across firms whereas normalization
introduces noise for the levels.
7The main idea, as elaborately discussed in Jouini and Napp (2007), is to summarize the heterogeneous
9
The average bias in beliefs, by construction, implies that when it is positive the (average)
view on the stock is optimistic, and when negative pessimistic. The weights, ht (θ), are such that
the weighted average of individual investors’ biases is the bias of the representative investor. We
also discuss alternative weights, average bias and dispersion measures in Remark 1. Importantly,
it is these weights that allow us to define belief dispersion in an intuitive way. Proposition 1
presents the average bias and dispersion along with the corresponding unique weights in our
economy in closed form.
PROPOSITION 1: The time-t average bias mt and dispersion vt in beliefs are given by
mt = m+
(
lnDt −
(
m+ µ− 1
2
σ2
)
t
) v2t
γσ2
, v2t =
v2σ2
σ2 + 1
γ
v2t
, (10)
where their initial values m and v are related to the initial mean m˜ and standard deviation v˜
of investor types as
m = m˜+
(
1− 1
γ
)
v2T, v2 =
(γ
2
v˜2 − γ
2
2T
σ2
)
+
√(γ
2
v˜2 − γ
2
2T
σ2
)2
+
γ2
T
v˜2σ2. (11)
The weights ht (θ) are uniquely identified to be given by
ht (θ) =
1√
2piv2t
e
− 1
2
(θ−mt)2
v2t , (12)
where mt, vt are as in (10).
Consequently, a higher belief dispersion vt leads to a higher average bias mt for relatively good
cash-flow news Dt > exp
(
m+ µ− 1
2
σ2
)
t, and to a lower average bias otherwise.
We see that the average bias in beliefs (10) is stochastic and depends on the cash-flow news
D.8 When there is good news, the relatively optimistic investors’ beliefs get supported, and
through their investment in the stock they get relatively wealthier. This in turn increases their
weight in equilibrium and consequently makes the view on the stock more optimistic. The
analogous mechanism makes the view on the stock more pessimistic following bad news.9
beliefs in the economy by a single consensus belief so that when the consensus investor has that consensus
belief and is endowed with the aggregate consumption in the economy, the resulting equilibrium is as in the
heterogeneous-investors economy. In a model with intertemporal consumption and finitely-many agents having
CRRA preferences, Jouini and Napp show that when investors’ preferences are not logarithmic, the consensus
belief is not necessarily well-defined since the process which aggregates investors’ beliefs is not a martingale, and
hence not a proper belief process. Differently from their analysis, as we demonstrate in the proof of Proposition
1 in Appendix A, it turns out this issue does not arise in our setting and we obtain a well-defined consensus
belief process for all risk aversion values due to the investors’ preferences being over horizon wealth.
8For notational convenience, we denote the initial values of the average bias and dispersion in beliefs by m
and v instead of m0 and v0, respectively. We note that the average bias can also be represented in terms of the
initial values by mt = σ
(
σm+ 1γ v
2ωt
)
/
(
σ2 + 1γ v
2t
)
.
9The wealth transfers among investors is the main underlying mechanism in dynamic heterogeneous-beliefs
models. We add to this literature by demonstrating in our subsequent analysis that these wealth transfers affect
10
As highlighted in Proposition 1, a higher belief dispersion leads to a higher average bias for
relatively good cash-flow news and to a lower average bias otherwise. This is notable since it
reveals that the extent of optimism/pessimism depends crucially on the level of belief dispersion
vt. In particular, dispersion amplifies the effects of cash-flow news on the average bias, and
hence the same level of good (bad) news leads to more optimism (pessimism) when dispersion
is higher. We illustrate this feature in Figure 1, where we plot the weights ht (θ) for different
levels of dispersion in relatively bad (panel (a)) and good (panel (b)) cash-flow news states.
The average bias is given by the point on the x−axis where the respective plot centers. We
see that higher dispersion plots are flatter and center at a point further away from the origin,
which shows that investors with relatively large biases are indeed assigned higher weights and
optimism/pessimism is amplified under higher dispersion. Investors’ attitude towards risk, γ,
influences the average bias too. In a more risk averse economy, investors hold relatively less stock
which limits the wealth transfers to the investors whose beliefs are supported. Consequently,
this reduces the sensitivity of the average bias to cash-flow news, leading to less optimism
(pessimism) for the same level of good (bad) news.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE ]
In the presence of heterogeneity in beliefs, the belief dispersion has a dual role. Besides
amplifying the current average bias in beliefs mt, the current belief dispersion vt also drives
the extent to which average bias fluctuates next instant, and hence represents the riskiness
of average bias. Indeed, it can be shown from (10) that the dynamics of average bias is
dmt = µmtdt + σmtdωt, where the diffusion term is σmt = v
2
t /γσ. As for the dynamics of
belief dispersion itself, as (10) highlights, the dispersion is at its highest level initially and then
decreases over time deterministically as investors with extreme beliefs tend to receive less and
less weight over time due to their diminishing wealth and impact in equilibrium. We discuss
the limiting behavior of dispersion in detail in Remark 3 of Section IV.
Equation (12) indicates that the time-t weights ht (θ), which can be thought of as the time-t
“effective” relative frequency of investors, have a convenient Gaussian form with mean mt and
standard deviation vt as also illustrated in Figure 1. This feature allows us to characterize
the wide range of investor heterogeneity in our economy by the average bias and dispersion in
beliefs since they are the first two (thus sufficient) central moments of Gaussian weights.
economic quantities also through the average bias and dispersion in beliefs, which are relatively easier to observe
in the data.
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REMARK 1 (Alternative average bias and dispersion in beliefs measures): In a dynamic econ-
omy such as ours, to characterize the equilibrium quantities in terms of the moments of belief
heterogeneity the stochastic impact of investors’ beliefs and wealth ought to be taken into
account. To capture the larger impact of wealthier investors on equilibrium prices, one may
alternatively define the average bias in beliefs as in (8) but using the wealth-share distribution
W (θ) /S as the weights. This definition does not require the construction of the representative
investor and yields alternative average bias and dispersion in beliefs measures denoted by m˜t
and v˜t, respectively, which can be shown to be given by
m˜t≡
ˆ
Θ
θ
Wt (θ)
St
dθ=mt−
(
1− 1
γ
)
v2t (T−t) , v˜2t ≡
ˆ
Θ
(θ−m˜t)2 Wt (θ)
St
dθ=
1
γ
v2t +
(
1− 1
γ
)
v2T , (13)
where mt, vt are as in (10).
10 As the expressions in (13) highlight, our average bias and
dispersion in beliefs coincide with their respective wealth-share weighted counterparts when the
preferences are logarithmic (γ = 1) and also at the horizon T . For non-logarithmic preferences,
at any point in time, the wealth-share weighted average bias m˜t differs from the average bias mt,
but only by a constant. This constant arises since the distinct θ-type investor with the highest
wealth is not the same investor whose bias has the highest impact on equilibrium quantities
when γ 6= 1. However, since the difference between the two average bias measures is a constant,
we obtain similar results and predictions if, instead of mt and vt, we use the wealth-share
weighted average bias and dispersion measures as in (13).
III. Stock Price, Its Dynamics and Trading Volume
In this Section, we investigate how the stock price, its mean return, volatility and trading
volume are affected by the average bias and dispersion in beliefs. In particular, we demonstrate
that in the presence of belief dispersion, the stock price is convex in cash-flow news. A higher
belief dispersion gives rise to a higher stock price and a lower mean return when the view on
the stock is relatively optimistic, and vice versa when pessimistic. We further show that a
higher belief dispersion leads to a higher stock volatility and trading volume. These findings
are consistent with empirical evidence.
10Above expressions are derived in the proof of Proposition 5 in Appendix A.
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A. Equilibrium Stock Price
PROPOSITION 2: In the economy with belief dispersion, the equilibrium stock price is given
by
St = Ste
mt(T−t)− 12γ (2γ−1)v2t (T−t)2 , (14)
where the average bias mt and dispersion vt in beliefs are as in Proposition 1, and the equilibrium
stock price in the benchmark economy with no belief dispersion is given by St = Dte
(µ−γσ2)(T−t).
Consequently, in the presence of belief dispersion,
i) The stock price is convex in cash-flow news Dt.
ii) The stock price is increasing in belief dispersion vt when mt > m˜+(1/2γ) (2γ − 1) v2t (T − t),
and is decreasing otherwise.
iii) The stock price is decreasing in investors’ risk aversion γ, as in the benchmark economy
for relatively good cash-flow news. However, the stock price is increasing in investors’ risk
aversion for relatively bad cash-flow news and low levels of risk aversion.
The stock price in the benchmark economy is driven by cash-flow news Dt, whereby good
news (higher Dt) leads to a higher stock price since investors increase their expectations of the
stock payoff DT . The equilibrium stock price in the presence of belief dispersion has a simple
structure, and is additionally driven by the average bias mt and dispersion vt in beliefs. The
role of the average bias in beliefs is to increase the stock price further following good news, and
conversely decrease following bad news. This is because, as discussed in Section II, following
good cash-flow news the view on the stock becomes relatively more optimistic which then leads
to a further increase in the expectation of the stock payoff, and consequently in the stock price,
and vice versa following bad news. Figure 2 plots the equilibrium stock price against cash-flow
news for different levels of belief dispersion, illustrating above points.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE ]
Figure 2 also illustrates the extra boost in the stock price due to increased optimism following
good news. The notable implication here is the convex stock price-news relation as opposed to
the linear one in the benchmark economy (Property (i)). The convexity implies that the increase
in the stock price following good news is more than the decrease following bad news (all else
fixed), which is also supported empirically (Basu (1997), Xu (2007)). It also implies that the
stock price is more sensitive to news (good or bad) in relatively good states. Conrad, Cornell,
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and Landsman (2002) document that bad news decreases the stock price more in good states
which is also in line with our finding. As mentioned in the Introduction, a similar convexity
property is obtained by Veronesi (1999), but due to parameter uncertainty in a model with
homogeneous agents.
Turning to the role of belief dispersion vt, we see that its influence on the stock price (14)
enters via two channels: directly (v2t term) and indirectly (via average bias in beliefs mt). The
direct effect always decreases the stock price for plausible levels of risk aversion (γ > 1/2) since
dispersion represents the riskiness of the average bias (as discussed in Section II). The indirect
effect, due to dispersion amplifying the average bias (Section II), increases the stock price
further following relatively good news and decreases it further following relatively bad news.
Since both effects have a negative impact following bad news, the stock price always decreases
in relatively bad states due to dispersion. On the other hand, for sufficiently good cash-flow
news, the indirect effect of dispersion dominates and the stock price increases. These are also
illustrated in Figure 2.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE ]
Consequently, a notable implication here is that the stock price increases in belief dispersion
when the view on the stock is relatively optimistic, and decreases otherwise (Property (ii)). A
higher belief dispersion leading to a higher stock price is often found to be somewhat surprising
since, instead of requiring a premium for the extra uncertainty due to belief dispersion, investors
appear to pay a premium for it. Our model reconciles with this seemingly counterintuitive
finding by demonstrating that a higher dispersion may lead to a higher stock price when the
stock price is driven by sufficiently optimistic beliefs. This is supported by the stock price
evidence in Yu (2011). Yu provides evidence that a higher belief dispersion increases growth
stock (low book-to-market) prices more than value stock prices, and associates growth stocks
with optimism motivated by the findings of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), La Porta
(1996). He also finds weak evidence that value stock prices in fact decrease under higher
dispersion.
Figure 3 presents the effects of risk aversion on the equilibrium stock price and highlights
that in the presence of belief dispersion the stock price may actually increase in investors’ risk
10We note that unlike earlier Figures, these plots are not for different levels of current belief dispersion vt but
for different levels of standard deviation of investor types v˜, since vt depends on γ and therefore cannot be fixed
across different levels of relative risk aversion.
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aversion γ (Property (iii)). In the benchmark economy, the stock price always decreases in
investors’ risk aversion. This is intuitive since in a more risk averse economy, investors demand
a higher return to hold the risky stock and so push down its price. In the presence of belief
dispersion, risk aversion has an additional stochastic impact on the stock price through the
average bias in beliefs. As discussed in Section II, a higher risk aversion makes the average
bias less sensitive to news since it reduces the magnitude of wealth transfers among investors.
Therefore, the same level of bad news generates less pessimism, which leads to a relatively
higher stock price in a more risk averse economy. For a range of low risk aversion values this
additional impact overrides the benchmark behavior resulting with the stock price actually
being increasing in investors’ risk aversion. On the other hand, for relatively good news, both
the increased risk aversion and the accompanying reduced optimism induce investors to demand
a higher return, which leads to the stock price being monotonically decreasing in investors’ risk
aversion as in the benchmark economy.
B. Equilibrium Mean Return
In our economy, the mean return perceived by each θ-type investor, µS (θ), is different than
the (observed) true mean return, µS, with the relation between them being given by (4). To
make our results comparable to empirical studies, in this Section we present our results in terms
of the true mean return (as observed in the data), henceforth, simply referred to as the mean
return. Proposition 3 reports the equilibrium mean return and its properties.
PROPOSITION 3: In the economy with belief dispersion, the equilibrium mean return is given
by
µSt = µSt
(
1 +
1
γ
v2t
σ2
(T − t)
)2
−mt
(
1 +
1
γ
v2t
σ2
(T − t)
)
, (15)
where the average bias mt and dispersion vt in beliefs are as in Proposition 1, and the equilibrium
mean return in the benchmark economy with no belief dispersion is given by µSt = γσ
2.
Consequently, in the presence of belief dispersion,
i) The mean return is decreasing in belief dispersion vt when mt > v
2
t (m˜+ 2v
2
t (T − t))
× (2v2t − v2T )−1, and is increasing otherwise.
ii) The mean return is increasing in investors’ risk aversion γ, as in the benchmark economy
for relatively good cash-flow news. However, the mean return is decreasing in investors’
risk aversion for relatively bad cash-flow news and low levels of risk aversion.
The presence of belief dispersion makes the equilibrium mean return stochastic (a constant
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in benchmark economy) and strictly decreasing in the average bias in beliefs mt.
11 This is
because, the higher the average bias, the higher the stock price (Section III.A), and therefore,
the stock receives more negative subsequent news on average when the view on it is relatively
optimistic, which in turn leads to a lower mean return.12
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE ]
Figure 4 plots the equilibrium mean return against cash-flow news for different levels of
belief dispersion and illustrates that a higher belief dispersion vt leads to a lower mean return
when the view on the stock is sufficiently optimistic, and to a higher mean return otherwise
(Property (i)). The intuition for this is similar to that for the stock price: dispersion represents
additional risk for investors (Section II), and therefore investors demand a higher return to
hold the stock when dispersion is higher. However, we know that dispersion also amplifies the
average bias in beliefs (Section II), which in turn leads to a lower mean return when the view on
the stock is optimistic and to a higher mean return when pessimistic. When there is sufficiently
optimistic view on the stock, the latter effect dominates and produces the negative relation
between belief dispersion and mean return.
As discussed in the Introduction, the empirical evidence on the relation between belief
dispersion and mean return is vast and mixed, and existing theoretical works explain only one
side of this relation. Our model generates both the negative and positive effects and implies that
the documented negative relation must be due to the optimistic bias and it should be stronger,
the higher the optimism. Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) provide supporting evidence for
our implications by finding an optimistic bias in their study overall, and by also showing that
the negative effect of dispersion is indeed stronger for more optimistic stocks. Similar evidence
is also provided by Yu (2011) who documents that high dispersion stocks earn lower returns
than low dispersion ones and this effect is more pronounced for growth (low book-to-market)
stocks which tend to represent overly optimistic stocks (see, for example, Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1994), La Porta (1996) and Skinner and Sloan (2002)).
11It may appear somewhat unusual to have the mean return expression (15) involve a term with the belief
dispersion raised to the fourth power. This occurs because the equilibrium mean return is equal to the market
price of risk times the stock volatility, as alternatively expressed in (A36), and both these quantities involve the
squared dispersion term v2t . A similar term also arises in our richer economy with Bayesian learning as (54)
illustrates.
12The stock receiving more negative subsequent news on average when the view on it is relatively optimistic
is due to the fact that the true data generating process, the cash-flow news, has constant parameters, which
imply that the consecutive ratios (Dt/Dt−h) and (Dt+h/Dt) are i.i.d. lognormal.
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Property (ii) highlights an interesting feature that the equilibrium mean return may de-
crease in investors’ risk aversion for relatively bad news states over a range of risk aversion
values. Analogous to the intuition given for the stock price (Section III.A), this result is again
due to bad news leading to less pessimism in more risk averse economies. We again note that
for relatively good news, the mean return monotonically increases in investors’ risk aversion as
in the benchmark economy. This is because both the increased risk aversion and the accompa-
nying reduced optimism induce investors to demand a higher return. A similar non-monotonic
relation between the mean return and risk aversion is demonstrated by David (2008). Our result
compliments David’s by providing the additional insight that the relation between the mean
return and risk aversion depends on the level of the optimism/pessimism on the stock, and is
non-monotonic only when the view is relatively pessimistic, but it is monotonic otherwise.
C. Stock Volatility and Trading Volume
In our economy, investors manifest their differing beliefs by taking diverse stock positions,
which in turn generate trade and wealth transfers among investors. As discussed in Section II,
these wealth transfers make the average bias in beliefs stochastic, which then leads to extra
uncertainty for investors. In this Section, we demonstrate how this extra uncertainty and
investors’ trading motives give rise to higher stock volatility and trading volume.
PROPOSITION 4: In the economy with belief dispersion, the equilibrium stock volatility is given
by
σSt = σSt +
v2t
γσ
(T − t) , (16)
where the dispersion in beliefs vt is as in Proposition 1, and the equilibrium stock volatility in
the benchmark economy with no belief dispersion is given by σSt = σ.
Consequently, in the presence of belief dispersion, the stock volatility is increasing in belief
dispersion vt.
The key implication of Proposition 4 is that the stock volatility increases monotonically
in belief dispersion vt. This is because, the higher the dispersion, the average bias in beliefs
fluctuates more and hence so does the stock price (Section III.A), and this additional fluctu-
ation in the stock price across news states increases the stock volatility. Figure 5 illustrates
this feature by plotting the equilibrium stock volatility against belief dispersion. This result
is also consistent with the empirical evidence (Ajinkya and Gift (1985), Anderson, Ghysels,
and Juergens (2005) and Banerjee (2011)). As we discuss in the Introduction, several other
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theoretical works find that a higher investor belief heterogeneity leads to a higher stock volatil-
ity (e.g., Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006), Li (2007), David (2008),
Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), Banerjee and Kremer (2010), Andrei, Carlin, and Hasler
(2015)). Our contribution here is to express the stock volatility and obtain this result in terms
of belief dispersion itself (rather than overall belief heterogeneity), which is not straightforward
to obtain in two-investor economies as we show in Section IV.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE ]
We now explore the aggregate trading activity in our economy. Towards this, we first
express each θ-type investor’s portfolio holdings in terms of the number of shares held in the
stock, ψ (θ) = φ (θ)W (θ) /S, with dynamics dψt (θ) = µψt (θ) dt + σψt (θ) dωt, where µψ (θ)
and σψ (θ) are the drift and volatility of θ-type investor’s portfolio process ψ (θ), respectively.
Following recent works in continuous-time settings (e.g., Xiong and Yan (2010), Longstaff and
Wang (2012)), we consider a trading volume measure V that sums over the absolute value of
investors’ portfolio volatilities,
Vt ≡ 1
2
ˆ
Θ
|σψt (θ)| dθ, (17)
where the adjustment 1/2 is to prevent double summation of the shares traded across investors.13
Proposition 5 reports the equilibrium trading volume measure in closed form and its properties.
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE ]
PROPOSITION 5: In the economy with belief dispersion, the equilibrium trading volume mea-
sure is given by
Vt=
σ
X2t
v2t
v2T
[(
Xt
2
+
√
X2t +4
2
)
φ
(
Xt
2
−
√
X2t +4
2
)
−
(
Xt
2
−
√
X2t +4
2
)
φ
(
Xt
2
+
√
X2t +4
2
)]
, (18)
where the dispersion in beliefs vt is as in Proposition 1, and φ (.) is the probability density
function of the standard normal random variable, and X is a (positive) deterministic process
given by
X2t = γ
2σ
4
v4T
[
1
γ
v2t +
(
1− 1
γ
)
v2T
]
.
13As is well recognized, employing the standard definition of trading volume, 12
´
Θ
|dψt (θ)| dθ in a continuous-
time setting is problematic since the local variation of the driving uncertainty, Brownian motion ω, and hence an
investor’s portfolio, is unbounded. The measure V defined in (17) does not suffer from this issue and indicates
the unexpected trading volume by not taking into account of expected changes in investors’ portfolio processes.
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Consequently, in the presence of belief dispersion, the trading volume measure is increasing in
belief dispersion vt and is positively related to the stock volatility σSt.
With belief dispersion, investors take diverse stock positions following cash-flow news, which
in turn generate non-trivial trading activity. Naturally, the aggregate trading activity in the
stock, which is captured by our trading volume measure V, increases as the belief dispersion
increases. This is because, when dispersion is higher, investors with relatively different beliefs
have more weight and higher trading demand, which increase the stock trading volume. Figure
6a illustrates this feature by depicting the equilibrium trading volume measure against belief
dispersion. This result is well-supported by empirical evidence (Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift
(1991), Bessembinder, Chan, and Seguin (1996) and Goetzmann and Massa (2005)). Figure
6b plots the equilibrium trading volume measure against stock volatility and illustrates the
positive relation between these two economic quantities. This positive relation is intuitive since
a higher dispersion leads to both a higher stock volatility and a higher trading volume measure.
This result is also supported by empirical evidence; for example, Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen
(1992) document a positive correlation between the conditional stock volatility and trading
volume, and more recently, Banerjee (2011) shows that stocks in high trading volume quintiles
tend to have higher return variances.
REMARK 2 (Multiple stock payoffs and consumption dates): To highlight our main insights
as clearly as possible in a tractable setting, we model the stock as a claim to a single payoff.
We provide an extension of our analysis that features additional stock payoffs and consump-
tion dates in Internet Appendix ID. We first consider an economy with two stock payoffs and
consumption dates in which investors have logarithmic preferences. We demonstrate that the
equilibrium average bias and dispersion in beliefs are the same as in our main model for loga-
rithmic preferences (Proposition 1). This is because in both economies investors have different
beliefs about the cash-flow news process, and hence the introduction of additional stock payoffs
does not alter investors’ beliefs. Consequently, the underlying economic mechanism revealed in
Section 3 is also present in this setting, where the belief dispersion amplifies the average bias so
that the same level of good (bad) news leads to more optimism (pessimism) when dispersion is
higher. The stock price in this extended economy simply becomes the sum of the values of each
payoff, but with a deterministic adjustment term for the longer-term payoff which accounts for
the drop in the stock price due to the interim payoff. Since each value term is as in our main
model, the stock price inherits our earlier key properties of the stock price being convex in
cash-flow news and being increasing in belief dispersion when the view on the stock is relatively
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optimistic, and decreasing otherwise (Proposition 2). Although we determine the stock price
dynamics of mean return and volatility in closed form, we are unable to analytically obtain
their comparative statics for all periods (elaborated on in Appendix ID). Investigating these
numerically, however, reveals that the stock mean return is decreasing in belief dispersion when
the view on the stock is relatively optimistic, and increasing otherwise, and the stock volatility
is increasing in belief dispersion, as in our main model (Propositions 3–4).
We then extend the setting further and add a third stock payoff and consumption date. We
show that the average bias and dispersion in beliefs are identical to those in our main model, and
the stock price is again the sum of the values of each payoff, but with more complex deterministic
adjustment terms for the longer-term payoffs accounting additionally for the second drop in the
stock price. Therefore, all the properties discussed for the economy with two stock payoffs
and consumption dates remain valid in this setting. The extended setting with multiple stock
payoffs and consumption dates, however, is less tractable as we are only able to solve it with
logarithmic preferences. For CRRA preferences, we are not able to determine the average bias
and dispersion in beliefs explicitly due to the inability to obtain the investors’ weights explicitly,
as we elaborate on in Appendix ID. Nevertheless, our main economic mechanisms at play and
results remain valid in the multiple stock payoff settings that we analyze.
IV. Comparisons with Two-Investor Economy
So far, we have investigated an economy with a continuum of investors having heterogeneous
beliefs. In this Section, we consider an otherwise identical two-investor economy with heteroge-
neous beliefs and a single consumption date. The related work of Kogan et al. (2006) employs
such a setup. We solve for the equilibrium stock price, its dynamics and trading volume and
demonstrate that most of our earlier results do not necessarily obtain in this setting. In this
regard, we first show that in the two-investor economy it does not appear to be possible to nei-
ther write the average bias in terms of belief dispersion nor express the equilibrium quantities
in terms of these two quantities as we do in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. We also show that,
in contrast to our main model’s implications, the stock price is no longer convex in cash-flow
news across all states of the world, and a higher belief dispersion has ambiguous effects on the
stock volatility and trading volume.
Now we consider a variant of our economy in Section I in which there are two investors
instead of a continuum of them. The other features remain the same. In particular, the
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securities market is as in Section I.A and the investors’ beliefs are as in Section I.B. That
is, under the θn-type investor’s beliefs, n = 1, 2, the cash-flow news process has dynamics
dDt = (µ+ θn)Dtdt+σDtdωnt, where ωn is her perceived Brownian motion with respect to her
own probability measure Pθn , and is given by ωnt = ωt − θnt/σ. We again index each θn-type
investor by her bias θn, with the type space now becoming Θ = {θ1, θ2} rather than Θ = R
as in our main model. Without loss of generality we assume θ1 < θ2, hence we interpret the
first investor as the relatively pessimistic investor with a bias θ1, and the second investor as the
relatively optimistic investor with a bias θ2. We assume that investors are initially endowed
with equal shares of the stock, ψ10 = ψ20 = 0.5. Investors’ preferences are as in Section I.C,
however for tractability we take the investors’ relative risk aversion coefficient γ to be a positive
integer, as is usually assumed in this literature (e.g., Yan (2008), Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal
(2009), Dumas, Lewis, and Osambela (2017)).
We again proceed by first constructing the average bias and dispersion in beliefs following
Definition 1 in our main model.14 That is, the time-t average bias in beliefs, mt, is the implied
bias of the corresponding representative investor, expressed as the weighted average of the
individual investors’ biases
mt =
2∑
n=1
θnhnt, (19)
with the weights hnt > 0 satisfying
∑2
n=1 hnt = 1, and the dispersion in beliefs, vt, is the
standard deviation of investors’ biases
v2t ≡
2∑
n=1
(θn −mt)2 hnt. (20)
We then determine the ensuing equilibrium weights, average bias and belief dispersion, and solve
for the equilibrium stock price, its dynamics and the trading volume measure in this economy.
Proposition 6 reports these quantities.15 Kogan et al. (2006) study the stock price and dynamics
in a similar setting with a focus on the long-run survival and price impact of investors with
biases. Our analysis here complements theirs by providing closed-form expressions for the stock
price, its dynamics and the trading volume measure.
14Other, alternative dispersion measures employed in the literature for two-investor economies include the
simple difference in (possibly stochastic) biases (θ2 − θ1) (e.g., Basak (2005), Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal
(2009), Xiong and Yan (2010)) and the relative likelihood ratio process (η2t/η1t) (e.g., David (2008), Bhamra
and Uppal (2014)). However, both of these measures capture the overall effects of belief heterogeneity rather
than decomposing its effects due to average bias and dispersion in beliefs, as we do. Moreover, these dispersion
measures are hard to generalize when there are more than two investors in the economy, since one still needs to
find a suitable, economically justified, functional form for the dispersion measure which takes all the differences
in biases, or likelihood ratios, as inputs and delivers a single dispersion measure.
15For clarity, throughout this section, we use the same notation for equilibrium quantities as in our main
model.
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PROPOSITION 6: In the two-investor economy with heterogeneous beliefs, the time-t average
bias and investors’ corresponding equilibrium weights are given by
mt =
γ∑
k=0
Gt,ke
γσ( kγ
θ1
σ
+ γ−k
γ
θ2
σ )(T−t)∑γ
j=0Gt,je
γσ( jγ
θ1
σ
+ γ−j
γ
θ2
σ )(T−t)
(
k
γ
θ1 +
γ − k
γ
θ2
)
, (21)
h1t =
γ∑
k=0
Gt,ke
γσ( kγ
θ1
σ
+ γ−k
γ
θ2
σ )(T−t)∑γ
j=0Gt,je
γσ( jγ
θ1
σ
+ γ−j
γ
θ2
σ )(T−t)
k
γ
, h2t = 1− h1t, (22)
and the dispersion in beliefs by (20) with (21)–(22) substituted in, where Gt,k is as in (27). The
equilibrium stock price, mean return and volatility are given by
St = e
(µ−γσ2)(T−t)Dt
γ∑
k=0
gt,ke
σ( kγ
θ1
σ
+ γ−k
γ
θ2
σ )(T−t), (23)
µSt =
[
γσ−
γ∑
k=0
gt,k
(
k
γ
θ1
σ
+
γ−k
γ
θ2
σ
)][
σ+
γ∑
k=0
pt,k
(
k
γ
θ1
σ
+
γ−k
γ
θ2
σ
)
−
γ∑
k=0
gt,k
(
k
γ
θ1
σ
+
γ−k
γ
θ2
σ
)]
, (24)
σSt =σ +
γ∑
k=0
pt,k
(
k
γ
θ1
σ
+
γ − k
γ
θ2
σ
)
−
γ∑
k=0
gt,k
(
k
γ
θ1
σ
+
γ − k
γ
θ2
σ
)
, (25)
where
gt,k =
Gt,k∑γ
j=0Gt,j
, pt,k =
Gt,ke
σ( kγ
θ1
σ
+ γ−k
γ
θ2
σ )(T−t)∑γ
j=0Gt,je
σ( jγ
θ1
σ
+ γ−j
γ
θ2
σ )(T−t)
, (26)
Gt,k =
γ!
k! (γ−k)!η
k
γ
1tη
γ−k
γ
2t e
(γ−1)σ( kγ
θ1
σ
+ γ−k
γ
θ2
σ )Te
− 1
2
[
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γ
θ21
σ2
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γ
θ22
σ2
+2γσ( kγ
θ1
σ
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γ
θ2
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θ1
σ
+ γ−k
γ
θ2
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2
]
(T−t)
, (27)
η1t = e
θ1
σ
ωt− 12
θ21
σ2
t, η2t = e
θ2
σ
ωt− 12
θ22
σ2
t. (28)
The equilibrium trading volume measure is given by
Vt =
1
2
2∑
n=1
Wnt
St
∣∣φntσWn/St + σφnt∣∣ , (29)
where the investors’ wealth-share Wn/S, the portfolio strategies φn, as well as their correspond-
ing diffusion terms, σWn/S, and σφn, are provided in the Internet Appendix IA, for n = 1, 2.
Proposition 6 reveals that in the two-investor economy, the average bias in beliefs and belief
dispersion have more complex structures as compared to their counterparts (10) in our main
model.16 In particular, it does not appear to be possible to write the average bias in terms of
16One apparent difference in the expressions of Proposition 6 from the corresponding ones in our main model
of Propositions 1–5 is that the two-investor economy quantities are driven by the stochastic likelihood ratios
η1t and η2t (through (27)), capturing belief heterogeneity. In our main model, investors’ likelihood ratios do
not appear in equilibrium quantities because summing (integrating) across all the investors in the equilibrium
market clearing condition yields a compact exponential function that embeds investors’ likelihood ratios. As we
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dispersion and obtain its amplification effect as we do in Proposition 1. Moreover, in this setting
the distribution of investors’ equilibrium weights, hnt, do not have the convenient Gaussian form
as in our main model. Therefore, we cannot characterize the investor belief heterogeneity, and
consequently express the equilibrium quantities, in terms of the first two central moments, the
average bias and dispersion in beliefs. Instead, the expressions for the equilibrium stock price
and its dynamics are now more involved and are in terms of various weighted-average quantities,
gt,k and pt,k, which are not straightforward to interpret economically. This is in contrast to our
main model presented in Section III, where the corresponding equilibrium quantities are in
terms of easily interpretable moments, the average bias and dispersion in beliefs, which also
enable us to isolate the effects of dispersion and conduct comparative statics with respect to
dispersion only.
[INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE ]
We now look at the effects of belief dispersion in the two-investor economy. To illustrate
these, Figure 7 plots the equilibrium quantities against cash-flow news in this economy with
one investor optimistic and the other pessimistic, as well as presenting the corresponding plots
for single-investor economies. Figure 7a reveals that the stock price is no longer convex in
cash-flow news across all states as opposed to that in our model (discussed in Section III.A).
Likewise, Figure 7b illustrates that the mean return does not always decrease in cash-flow
news, but in fact may even increase in moderate states. These different implications in the two-
investor economy occur because belief heterogeneity effectively vanishes in relatively extreme
states (as also elaborated on in Remark 3 below). The pessimistic (optimistic) investor controls
almost all the wealth in the economy in very bad (good) news states, leading to equilibrium
behavior similar to that in single pessimistic (optimistic) investor economies in those states. The
transition from the moderate states in which belief heterogeneity is still prevalent to relatively
extreme states leads to the irregular behavior in the plots. In contrast in our main model
with a continuum of investors having all possible beliefs, investor heterogeneity does not vary
across states of the world (since belief dispersion vt is deterministic) and does not vanish in
demonstrate in the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A, this compact function is related to the average bias
and dispersion and allows us to express the equilibrium quantities in terms of these moments. Furthermore, in
this two-investor economy as well as in our main model, the likelihood ratio processes η turns out to be path-
independent primarily because of the cash-flow news process (2) having constant coefficients in its dynamics
which in turn leads to path-independent stock price and dynamics. This is in contrast to a setting with more
complex cash-flow news process dynamics which may lead to path-dependent likelihood ratio processes (e.g.,
Basak (2000)), and hence path-dependent stock price and dynamics.
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relatively extreme states, leading to simple uniform economic behavior. For example, following
very good news, a relatively pessimistic investor would lose much wealth both in our model
and in the two-investor economy. However, since there are numerous optimistic investors in our
main model, the wealth transfer does not accumulate to one type of optimistic investor and
make her dominate the economy, but rather shared among relatively optimistic investors.
The belief heterogeneity effectively vanishing in relatively extreme states also leads to
nonuniform behavior for the stock volatility and trading volume in the two-investor economy.
In particular, Figure 7c reveals that a higher belief dispersion increases the stock volatility only
for moderate news states in which neither investor dominates the economy. However, for rela-
tively extreme states the stock volatility actually decreases with higher belief dispersion, as the
effective investor heterogeneity vanishes and the single-investor benchmark economy prevails.
Similarly, Figure 7d reveals that the trading volume measure may actually decrease with higher
belief dispersion in the two-investor economy, in contrast to our uniformly increasing trading
volume belief dispersion result.17
In sum, by keeping investor heterogeneity the same across states, our main model is able
to generate intuitive, simple and uniform results, which are not immediately possible in the
two-investor economy, as Figure 7 illustrates. We note that the discussion above is not specific
to a two-investor economy, i.e., Θ = {θ1, θ2}. Our conclusions would be equally valid in a
more general model with finitely-many investors, i.e., Θ = {θ1, . . . , θN} where N can be a large
number. This is because in this more general model also there is necessarily a lower bound
and an upper bound for investors’ biases, say θ ≡ min {θ1, . . . , θN} and θ ≡ max {θ1, . . . , θN}.
Hence belief heterogeneity would again vanish in relatively extreme states because now the
most pessimistic θ-type investor would eventually control almost all the wealth in the economy
in very bad states, and the most optimistic θ-type investor in very good states. This would
again lead to equilibrium behavior similar to that in single-investor economies in those extreme
states, implying the irregular behavior depicted in the plots.
REMARK 3 (Survival across states and over time): As the above discussion highlights, in the
two-investor economy only one type of investor survives in extreme states of the world where
survival is defined as an investor’s wealth ratio (e.g., W1t/W2t) not vanishing in the limit, or
equivalently in our analysis an investor’s equilibrium weight (e.g., h1t) not vanishing. Formally,
as shown in the proof of Proposition 6 in Internet Appendix IA, we obtain the following limiting
17While we have identified these implications, perhaps it is helpful to highlight that there could well be
quantities other than the ones we focus on (e.g., stock price dynamics and trading volume) that one of two
settings (a continuum of investors vs two investors) generates implications that are better supported by the
empirical evidence. We leave that for future research.
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behavior of equilibrium weights hnt in (22) and belief dispersion vt:
as Dt → 0 h1t → 1, vt → 0, (30)
as Dt →∞ h1t → 0, vt → 0. (31)
The two-investor economy collapses to a single-investor economy in the limit of extreme states
(Dt → 0 or Dt → ∞) as the belief dispersion vanishes. This is in sharp contrast to our main
model with a continuum of investors for which belief dispersion never vanishes
as Dt → 0 or Dt →∞ vt = vσ(σ2 + v2t/γ)−1/2 > 0, (32)
because belief dispersion in (10) does not depend on the cash-flow news Dt – this is also
illustrated in Figure 1 depicting that changes in Dt only shifts the equilibrium weight schedule
ht (θ) without scaling it. The reason for this behavior is that our model has a continuum of
investors who have all possible beliefs, that is, the type space is unbounded, i.e., Θ = R. Hence
even in the extreme states, the wealth transfer does not accumulate to one type of investor
and make her dominate the economy, but rather is shared among investors, leading to a non-
vanishing belief dispersion across all states.18
Even though our main model and the two-investor economy yield different implications for
survival across states, they imply the same behavior for survival over time. In particular, both
models imply that in the long run as T →∞, only the investor with a bias closest to (γ − 1)σ2
survives, a finding consistent with earlier works in similar settings (e.g., Kogan et al. (2006),
Cvitanic´ and Malamud (2011)). In particular, in our two-investor economy we obtain (Internet
Appendix IA)
as T →∞
h1T → 1, vT → 0 if
θ1+θ2
2
> (γ − 1)σ2,
h1T → 0, vT → 0 if θ1+θ22 < (γ − 1)σ2.
(33)
Only in the knife-edge case when both investors’ biases are equally distanced from (γ − 1)σ2
both investors survive, that is when (θ1 + θ2) /2 = (γ − 1)σ2, as also demonstrated by Kogan
et al. (2006). In our main model with a continuum of investors with all possible beliefs this
knife-edge case does not arise since an investor with a bias of (γ − 1)σ2 always exists and
becomes the only surviving investor in the long-run, implying
as T →∞ vT → 0. (34)
18That being said, our model can be reached in the limit of a finitely-many-investor setting by letting θ → −∞,
θ →∞, N →∞, along with a suitable relative frequency of investors which tends to a Gaussian distribution in
the limit. Of course, in the limiting case there are an uncountable number of investors (a continuum) as in our
model rather than finitely-many investors, which again leads to a non-vanishing belief dispersion.
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It is also important to note that even though investor heterogeneity disappears in the long-
run, it may take a very long time to do so. For example, in our main model using the belief
dispersion equation in (10), it can be shown that the half-life of dispersion at time t is 3γσ2/v2t .
Using the parameter values as in Figure 1, this half-life expression would indicate that it takes
837.5 years for a belief dispersion of 3.20% to decrease to 0.40% (halving 3 times) and it takes
another 2552.3 years from 0.40% to halve and become 0.20%, consistent with Yan (2008).
V. Multiple Stocks Economy
Our results so far have been presented in the context of a single-stock economy to highlight
our insights as clearly as possible. However, given that the documented empirical evidence is
primarily based on cross-sectional studies, in this Section, we generalize our main model to
feature multiple stocks, on which investors have dispersed beliefs. We demonstrate that all
our main results and underlying economic mechanisms still go through in this more elaborate
economy.
The multi-stock economy we consider here is the simplest and the most straightforward
extension of our single-stock setting of Section I, also admitting much tractability.19 In this
setting, there are instead N risky stocks and N sources of risk, generated by a standard N -
dimensional Brownian motion ω = (ω1, . . . , ωN−1, ω)
ᵀ defined on the true probability measure
P. Each stock price Sn, n = 1, . . . , N , is posited to have dynamics dSnt = Snt [µSntdt+ σSntdωt] ,
where the stock mean return µSn and the N -dimensional stock volatility vector σSn are to be
determined in equilibrium. The stocks are in positive net supply of one unit and are claims
to the payoffs DnT , paid at some horizon T . For n = 1, . . . , N − 1, these payoffs DnT are the
horizon value of the cash-flow news processes with dynamics
dDnt = Dnt [µndt+ σndωnt + σdωt] , (35)
where µn, σn, σ are constants, and represent the true mean growth rate of the expected payoff
and the uncertainty about the payoff due to ωn, ω, respectively. To maintain tractability, the
cash-flow news for the last (residual) stock N is chosen so that the aggregate cash-flow news
D =
∑N
n=1 Dn has the dynamics (2) as in our single-stock setting. In this setting, we focus on
19Solving multi-stock pure-exchange economies is typically a daunting task, but there has been some re-
cent successes in the literature (e.g., Cochrane, Longstaff, and Santa-Clara (2007), Martin (2013), Chabakauri
(2013)). Introducing belief dispersion on individual stock payoffs in these settings would add even more com-
plexity. One recent work accomplishing tractability in a related two-country international finance setting is
Dumas, Lewis, and Osambela (2017).
26
the price and dynamics of the first N − 1 stocks, which includes all I dispersed stocks, and not
the N th stock whose payoff has been left unspecified and theoretically can be negative.20
There is a continuum of investors who commonly observe all cash-flow news processes Dn
(35), but have different beliefs about the dynamics of the first I < N of them. We refer
to the first I stocks as dispersed stocks, and the ones that investors agree on as the non-
dispersed stocks. The investors are again indexed by their type θ, where a θ-type investor
is now associated with an I-dimensional bias vector θ = (θ1, . . . , θI)
ᵀ with its ith element
representing the investor’s bias on the mean growth rate of stock i expected payoff. Hence,
under the θ-type investor’s beliefs, the cash-flow news processes have dynamics
dDit = Dit [(µi + θi) dt+ σidωit (θ) + σdωt] , for i = 1, . . . , I, (36)
dDnt = Dnt [µndt+ σndωnt + σdωt] , for n = I + 1, . . . , N − 1, (37)
where ωi (θ), i = 1, . . . , I, are her perceived Brownian motions with respect to her own proba-
bility measure Pθ, and is given by ωit (θ) = ωit − θit/σi.21
The investor type space, denoted by Θ, is taken to be the whole I-dimensional Euclidean
space RI to incorporate all possible beliefs on the dispersed stocks. Accordingly, we now assume
a multivariate Gaussian distribution with an I-dimensional mean vector m˜ = (m˜1, . . . , m˜I)
ᵀ and
a diagonal variance matrix v˜2 = diag (v˜21, . . . , v˜
2
I ) whose main diagonal entries starting in the
upper left corner are v˜21, . . . , v˜
2
I and the entries outside the main diagonal are all zero, for the
relative frequency of investors over the type space Θ.22 As before, we assume that all investors
are initially equally endowed in all the stocks, implying that the initial total wealth of the group
of investors having the bias vector θ, denoted as the distinct θ-type investor, as
W0 (θ) = W0 (θ1, . . . , θI) = S0
I∏
i=1
1√
2piv˜2i
e
− 1
2
(θi−m˜i)2
v˜2
i ,
where S0 is the (endogenous) initial aggregate stock price S0 =
∑N
n=1 Sn0. In this setting, each
distinct θ-type investor chooses an admissible N -dimensional portfolio strategy (investment in
each stock) so as to maximize her CRRA preferences over the horizon value of her portfolio
WT (θ) as in (6) subject to the corresponding budget constraint.
20Modeling individual and aggregate cash-flow news as geometric Brownian motions is somewhat in the spirit
of Brennan and Xia (2001). To prevent the N th stock payoff potentially taking on negative values, one could
consider a setup with cash-flow news processes having stochastic volatilities as in Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi
(2004), Longstaff and Piazzesi (2004), but this would much complicate our analysis and is beyond the scope of
our goal in this section.
21The dynamics of the N th stock could be derived from (36)–(37) and (2) using the identity Dt =
∑N
n=1Dnt.
22This simplifying assumption is the most straightforward natural extension of our main model and ensures
that the investor population again has a finite (unit) measure. While admitting much tractability, it however
rules out potential correlations across biases on individual stocks.
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We proceed by first constructing the average bias and dispersion in beliefs for dispersed
stocks following Definition 1 in our main model. The time-t average bias in beliefs, mit, on
stock i = 1, . . . , I is the implied bias of the corresponding representative investor, expressed as
the weighted average of the individual investors’ biases
mit =
ˆ
Θ
θiht (θ) dθ, (38)
where the weights ht (θ) > 0 are such that
´
Θ
ht (θ) dθ = 1, while the dispersion in beliefs, vit,
is the standard deviation of investors’ biases
v2it ≡
ˆ
Θ
(θi −mit)2ht (θ) dθ. (39)
Proposition 7 reports the average bias and dispersion in beliefs, along with the corresponding
equilibrium stock prices, mean returns and volatilities in this economy in closed form.
PROPOSITION 7: The time-t average bias mit and dispersion vit in beliefs of dispersed stock
i = 1, . . . , I, are given by
mit = mi +
(
lnN + ln
Dit
Dt
−
(
mi + µi − µ− 1
2
σ2i
)
t
)1
γ
v2it
σ2i
, v2it =
v2i σ
2
i
σ2i +
1
γ
v2i t
, (40)
where their initial values mi and vi are related to the mean m˜i and standard deviation v˜i of
investor types as
mi = m˜i +
(
1− 1
γ
)
v2i T, v
2
i =
(γ
2
v˜2i −
γ2
2T
σ2i
)
+
√(γ
2
v˜2i −
γ2
2T
σ2i
)2
+
γ2
T
v˜2i σ
2
i . (41)
Moreover, the equilibrium stock price, mean return and volatility of dispersed stock i = 1, . . . , I,
are given by
Sit = Site
mit(T−t)− 12γ (2γ−1)v2it(T−t)2+v2it(T−t)2 , (42)
µSit = µSit −mit
(
1 +
v2it
γσ2i
(T − t)
)
, σSit =
√
σ2Sit + σ
2
i
((
1 +
v2it
γσ2i
(T − t)
)2
− 1
)
,(43)
while the corresponding quantities for non-dispersed stocks n = I + 1, . . . , N − 1, are given by
Snt = Dnte
(µn−γσ2)(T−t), µSnt = γσ
2, σSnt =
√
σ2 + σ2n, (44)
where the equilibrium stock price, mean return and volatility in the benchmark economy with no
belief dispersion are given by
Sit = Dite
(µi−γσ2)(T−t), µSit = γσ
2, σSit =
√
σ2 + σ2i . (45)
Consequently, in the presence of belief dispersion, for a dispersed stock i = 1, . . . , I,
i) A higher belief dispersion vit leads to a higher average bias mit for relatively good cash-flow
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news Dit > (Dt/N) exp(mi + µi − µ− 12σ2i )t, and to a lower average bias otherwise.
ii) The stock price is convex in its cash-flow news Dit.
iii) The stock price is increasing in belief dispersion vit when mit > m˜i − (1/2γ) v2it (T − t),
and is decreasing otherwise.
iv) The mean return is decreasing in belief dispersion vit when mit > v
2
itm˜i (2v
2
it − v2iT )−1 , and
is increasing otherwise.
v) The stock volatility is increasing in belief dispersion vit.
The average bias and dispersion in beliefs (40) for dispersed stocks are multivariate versions
of the single-stock case, but now adjusted to incorporate individual stock-specific quantities, µi,
σi, m˜i, v˜i. The fluctuations in the average bias are due to the (relative) cash-flow news Dit/Dt,
which are driven only by the Brownian motion ωi that investors’ beliefs differ on. Consequently,
the underlying economic mechanisms revealed in Section II for our main model are also present
in this setting with multiple stocks. In particular, for an individual dispersed stock, the belief
dispersion amplifies its average bias and the effective investor belief heterogeneity on it does
not vanish in relatively extreme states. Similarly, the equilibrium stock price, mean return and
volatility (42)–(43) for dispersed stocks are multi-stock versions of the corresponding single-
stock economy quantities with similar structures, but now incorporating individual stock specific
average bias mi and belief dispersion vi.
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Since the underlying economic mechanisms and the structures of the economic quantities in
this setting are as in our main model, all the implications for a dispersed stock’s average bias,
its price, mean return and volatility, are also as before, as highlighted in the properties (i)–(v)
of Proposition 7. One difference from the single-stock case is that we are unable to obtain the
equilibrium trading volume measure in this multiple stock setting. This is because there is
a convoluted interaction of investors’ views on dispersed stocks which prevents us identifying
investors’ portfolio reaction to changes in cash-flow news, which is required to compute the
23These is a slight difference in the exact appearance of the belief dispersion in these equilibrium expressions
as compared to the corresponding single-stock economy quantities. This is because in this setting investors
only disagree on the dynamics of some of the stocks and the average bias on each dispersed stock i is driven
only by the stock-specific single Brownian motion ωi rather than the Brownian motion ω that determines the
aggregate payoff. Hence, there is no additional risk arising from the covariance between the average bias and the
aggregate payoff since the Brownian motions ωi and ω are independent. This, in particular, leads to a simpler
mean return expression (43), which in terms of factors lnDt and ln (Dit/Dt) for i = 1, ..., I, can be expressed
as µSitdt = γCovt [d lnDt, d (Sit/Sit)] −
∑I
j=1
(
mjt/σ
2
j
)
Covt [d ln (Djt/Dt) , d (Sit/Sit)]. However, these small
differences turn out to be economically immaterial for our implications of belief dispersion as the properties
(i)–(v) of Proposition 7 highlight. This is because the main driving force behind our results is the fact that the
belief dispersion enters into and amplifies the average bias, which is still present in this multiple-stocks setting.
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trading volume. Nevertheless, to see whether or not our model supports the documented em-
pirical evidence on trading volume, in the subsequent analysis we use our single-stock economy
trading volume measure (18) of Section III.
VI. Economy with Bayesian Learning
So far, we have studied an economy where investors have dogmatic beliefs, which not only
simplified the analysis, but also demonstrated that our results are not driven by investors’
learning. In this Section, we consider a setting with parameter uncertainty and more rational
behavior for investors who optimally update their beliefs in a Bayesian fashion over time as
more data becomes available. This setting is also tractable. We again obtain fully-closed form
solutions for all quantities of interest, and show that all our results remain valid in this richer,
incomplete information economy. This specification also enables us disentangle the effects of
belief dispersion and parameter uncertainty on stock volatility, and establish the result that the
investors’ Bayesian learning induces less stock volatility when belief dispersion is higher.
To incorporate Bayesian learning in our main model, we make the following modification to
investors’ beliefs in Section I.B. The investors are again indexed by their type θ, but instead
of believing the mean growth rate of the expected payoff is µ + θ at all times 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
now the θ-type investor at time 0 believes that the mean growth rate of the expected payoff
is normally distributed with mean µ + θ and variance s2, N (µ+ θ, s2). This allows us to
interpret a θ-type investor as an investor with an initial bias of θ in her beliefs. The identical
prior variance s2 for all investors ensures that our results are not driven by heterogeneity in
confidence of their estimates. The normal prior and the Bayesian updating rule imply that the
time-t posterior distribution of µ, conditional on the information set Ft = {Ds : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, is
also normally distributed, N (µ+ θ̂t, s2t ), where the time-t bias of θ-type investor θ̂t (difference
between her mean estimate and the true µ) and the type-independent mean squared error s2t ,
which represents the level of parameter uncertainty, are reported in Proposition 8. Therefore,
under the θ-type investor’s beliefs, the posterior cash-flow news process has dynamics
dDt = Dt[(µ+ θ̂t)dt+ σdωt (θ)],
where ω (θ) is her perceived Brownian motion with respect to her own probability measure Pθ,
and is given by dωt (θ) = dωt− (θ̂t/σ)dt. We note that this specification conveniently nests the
earlier dogmatic beliefs economy when s2 = 0.
We proceed by first constructing the average bias and dispersion in beliefs following Defini-
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tion 1 in Section II. The time-t average bias in beliefs, mt, is the implied bias of the corresponding
representative investor, expressed as the weighted average of the individual investors’ biases
mt =
ˆ
Θ
θ̂tht (θ) dθ, (46)
with the weights ht (θ) > 0 are such that
´
Θ
ht (θ) dθ = 1, while the dispersion in beliefs, vt, is
the standard deviation of investors’ biases
v2t ≡
ˆ
Θ
(θ̂t −mt)2ht (θ) dθ. (47)
Proposition 8 reports the average bias and dispersion in beliefs along with the corresponding
unique weights in this economy with belief dispersion and parameter uncertainty in closed form.
PROPOSITION 8: The time-t average bias mt and dispersion vt in beliefs are given by
mt = m+
(
lnDt−
(
m+µ− 1
2
σ2
)
t
)(1
γ
v2+s2
) 1
σ2
v2t
v2
s2
s2t
, v2t =
v2σ2
σ2+
(
1
γ
v2 + s2
)
t
s2t
s2
, (48)
where the investors’ time-t parameter uncertainty st is given by
s2t =
s2σ2
σ2 + s2t
, (49)
and the initial values m and v are related to the initial mean m˜ and standard deviation v˜ of
investor types as
m=m˜+
(
1− 1
γ
)
v2T, v2 =
(γ
2
v˜2 − γ
2
2T
(
σ2+s2T
))
+
√(γ
2
v˜2 − γ
2
2T
(σ2+s2T )
)2
+
γ2
T
v˜2 (σ2+s2T ).
(50)
The weights ht (θ) are uniquely identified to be given by
ht (θ) =
1√
2piv2t
e
− 1
2
(θ̂t−mt)2
v2t
s2t
s2
, (51)
where mt, vt and st are as in (48)–(49) and the time-t bias of θ-type investor θ̂t is given by
θ̂t =
s2t
s2
θ +
s2t
σ
ωt. (52)
Consequently, in the presence of belief dispersion and parameter uncertainty, for economies with
the same initial average bias m and dispersion v,
i) The average bias in beliefs is increasing in parameter uncertainty st when
Dt > exp
((
m+ µ− 1
2
σ2
)
t
)
, and is decreasing otherwise.
ii) The dispersion in beliefs is decreasing in parameter uncertainty st.
The average bias and dispersion in beliefs (48) are generalizations of the earlier dogmatic
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beliefs case and are now additionally driven by parameter uncertainty st.
24 We see that, sim-
ilarly to the effect of dispersion, a higher parameter uncertainty leads to a relatively more
optimistic (pessimistic) view on the stock following good (bad) news (Property (i)), and this
then amplifies the volatility of the average bias relative to the dogmatic beliefs case. However,
the underlying mechanisms of belief dispersion and parameter uncertainty are notably differ-
ent. In the case of dispersion, the view on the stock becomes more optimistic following good
news, because the optimistic investors, whose beliefs are supported, become wealthier and this
increases their impact on the average bias in beliefs. In the case of parameter uncertainty, the
view on the stock becomes more optimistic following good news, because all Bayesian investors
increase their estimates of the mean growth rate of the expected payoff µ. Proposition 8 also
reveals that a higher parameter uncertainty leads to a lower dispersion in beliefs (Property (ii)).
This is intuitive because investors’ estimates of µ is a weighted average of their prior and the
data (cash-flow news). The higher the parameter uncertainty, the more weight investors place
on the data, which in turn reduces the differences in their estimates and the belief dispersion.
We remark that in this Section, we consider the effects of parameter uncertainty st only for
economies with the same initial average bias m and dispersion v, as highlighted in Proposition
8. This way, economies only differ in their initial level of parameter uncertainty s and our
results are not driven by the indirect effects through the initial average bias and dispersion.25
Proposition 9 reports the equilibrium stock price, its dynamics and the trading volume measure
in this economy with belief dispersion and parameter uncertainty in closed form.
PROPOSITION 9: In the economy with belief dispersion and parameter uncertainty, the equi-
librium stock price, mean return and volatility are given by
St = Ste
mt(T−t)− 12 (2γ−1)( 1γ v2+s2)
v2t
v2
s2
s2t
(T−t)2
, (53)
µSt = µSt
(
1+
1
σ2
(
1
γ
v2+s2
)
v2t
v2
s2
s2t
(T − t)
)2
−mt
(
1+
1
σ2
(
1
γ
v2+s2
)
v2t
v2
s2
s2t
(T − t)
)
,(54)
σSt = σSt +
1
σ
(1
γ
v2 + s2
)v2t
v2
s2
s2t
(T − t) , (55)
where the average bias mt, dispersion vt in beliefs and parameter uncertainty st are as in
Proposition 8 and the equilibrium stock price St, mean return µSt, and stock volatility σSt in
the benchmark economy with no belief dispersion are as in Propositions 2–4, respectively.
24Note that when s2 = 0, the ratio s2t/s
2 = 1 for all t, and the expressions in Proposition 8 collapse down to
the dogmatic beliefs economy expressions in Proposition 1.
25This is established by letting the initial indirect effect of parameter uncertainty fall on the mean m˜ and
standard deviation v˜ of investor types using the monotonic relations between m and m˜, and v and v˜ in (50).
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The equilibrium trading volume measure is given by
Vt=
σ
X2t
v2t
v2T
s2T
s2t
[(
Xt
2
+
√
X2t +4
2
)
φ
(
Xt
2
−
√
X2t +4
2
)
−
(
Xt
2
−
√
X2t +4
2
)
φ
(
Xt
2
+
√
X2t +4
2
)]
, (56)
where φ (.) is the probability density function of the standard normal random variable, and X
is a (positive) deterministic process given by
X2t =
γ2σ4
v4T
[
1
γ
v2t
s4T
s4t
+
(
1− 1
γ
)
v2T
]
. (57)
Consequently, in the presence of belief dispersion and parameter uncertainty, in addition to the
properties in Propositions 2–5, for economies with the same initial average bias m and dispersion
v, the stock volatility is increasing in parameter uncertainty st but this effect is decreasing in
belief dispersion vt.
Proposition 9 confirms that our earlier implications for the stock price, its dynamics and
the trading volume remain valid with Bayesian learning. However, these equilibrium quantities
are now also driven by the parameter uncertainty st. More notably, the additional effect
due to the parameter uncertainty now makes the stock price even more volatile as compared
with the dogmatic beliefs case. This is because a higher parameter uncertainty makes the
average bias more volatile, which leads to a higher stock price following relatively good news,
and to a lower stock price otherwise, compared to the dogmatic beliefs case. Therefore, in
this economy, the stock volatility is not only increasing in belief dispersion as in our earlier
analysis, but also in parameter uncertainty. Importantly, our stock volatility expression in (55)
allows us to disentangle the effects of belief dispersion from those of parameter uncertainty
and yields a novel testable implication that the parameter uncertainty (and the subsequent
Bayesian learning) induces less stock volatility when belief dispersion is higher.26 This is because
fluctuations in the average bias, and hence in the stock price, due to parameter uncertainty is
lower when dispersion is higher. In the literature, both channels are shown to generate higher
stock volatility. By disentangling these effects, our result may help future works to measure the
relative contributions of parameter uncertainty and belief dispersion in stock volatility better.
26The parameter uncertainty channel is shut down by setting s2 = 0 in (55), which implies s2t/s
2 = 1, and
yields σSt = σSt + (v
2
t /σγ) (T − t). Similarly, the belief dispersion channel is shut down by setting v2 = 0 in
(55), which implies v2t /v
2 = s4t/s
4, and yields σSt = σSt + (s
2
t/σ) (T − t).
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VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a dynamic model of belief dispersion which qualitatively
matches many of the empirical regularities in a stock price, its mean return, volatility, and trad-
ing volume. In our analysis, we have determined two sufficient measures, the average bias and
dispersion in beliefs, to summarize the wide range of investors’ beliefs and have demonstrated
that the equilibrium quantities are driven by these two key variables. Our model is tractable
and delivers exact closed-form expressions for quantities of interest.
We have found that the stock price increases in cash-flow news in a convex manner. We
have also shown that the stock price increases and its mean return decreases in belief dispersion
when the view on the stock is optimistic, and vice versa when pessimistic. We have found that
the presence of belief dispersion leads to a higher stock volatility, trading volume, and a positive
relation between these two quantities. We have disentangled the effects of belief dispersion and
learning on stock volatility, and found that the effects of learning is reduced when dispersion
is higher. Furthermore, we have demonstrated how otherwise identical two-investor economies
with heterogeneous beliefs and a single consumption date do not necessarily generate most of
our main results, particularly convexity.
In models such as ours where investors have preferences only over horizon wealth, the
discount factor is determined by the anticipation of future consumption. In contrast, in a
model with continuous consumption the discount factor is determined by market clearing in
the current consumption good. In such a model it is not immediately clear that all our results
would obtain. For example, when preferences in that setting are logarithmic there are no asset
pricing effects for the stock (e.g., Detemple and Murthy (1997), Atmaz (2014)), therefore the
model would not explain the empirical regularities observed in the stock market. On the other
hand, considering more general power preferences with intertemporal consumption leads to
the issue of the representative investor’s belief not being well-defined since the process that
aggregates investors’ beliefs is not a martingale, and hence not a proper belief process (see,
Jouini and Napp (2007)). Therefore, in that setting we may not obtain the average bias, then
back out the investors’ equilibrium weights, and define the belief dispersion as we do in our
model. Our setting turns out to not suffer from this issue and yields a well-defined belief
process for the representative investor for all risk aversion values due to her preferences being
over horizon wealth. We leave the analysis with continuous consumption for future research.
In the Internet Appendix ID we make some progress in that direction by extending our main
model with a single consumption date to one with multiple consumption dates.
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Figure 1. Investors’ weights. These panels plot the weights ht (θ) for each distinct θ-type investor
for different levels of current belief dispersion vt. The belief dispersion is vt = 3.23% in solid blue and
3.61% in dashed green lines. The vertical dotted black lines correspond to the benchmark economy
with no belief dispersion. The cash-flow news is relatively bad Dt = 1.22 in panel (a), and good
Dt = 2.50 in panel (b). The baseline parameter values follow from Table BI of Appendix B which
are based on matching the model implied belief dispersion moments to the corresponding summary
statistics in Yu (2011): m˜ = 0, v˜ = 3.39%, µ = 14.23%, σ = 8.25%, γ = 2, t = 4.37 and T = 10.
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Figure 2. Stock price convexity and effects of belief dispersion. This figure plots the
equilibrium stock price St against cash-flow news for different levels of current belief dispersion vt.
The dotted line corresponds to the equilibrium stock price in the benchmark economy with no belief
dispersion. The baseline parameter values are as in Figure 1.
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Figure 3. Effects of risk aversion on stock price. These figures plot the equilibrium stock
price St against relative risk aversion coefficient γ for different levels of standard deviation of investor
types v˜. The dotted lines correspond to the equilibrium stock price in the benchmark economy with
no belief dispersion. The cash-flow news is relatively bad Dt = 1.22 in panel (a) and good Dt = 2.50
in panel (b). The baseline parameter values are as in Figure 1.27
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Figure 4. Effects of belief dispersion on mean return. This figure plots the equilibrium mean
return µSt against cash-flow news for different levels of current belief dispersion vt. The dotted line
corresponds to the equilibrium mean return in the benchmark economy with no belief dispersion. The
baseline parameter values are as in Figure 1.
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Figure 5. Effects of belief dispersion on stock volatility. This figure plots the equilibrium
stock volatility σSt against current belief dispersion vt. The dotted line corresponds to the equilibrium
stock volatility in the benchmark economy with no belief dispersion. The baseline parameter values
are as in Figure 1.
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Figure 6. Effects of belief dispersion on trading volume measure. These figures plot the
equilibrium trading volume measure Vt against current belief dispersion vt in panel (a) and against
stock volatility σSt in panel (b) for different relative risk aversion coefficients γ. The baseline parameter
values are as in Figure 1.
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Figure 7. Effects of belief dispersion in the two-investor economy. These figures plot the
equilibrium stock price St in panel (a), the mean return µSt in panel (b), the stock volatility in panel
(c), and the trading volume measure in panel (d) against cash-flow news in an otherwise identical two-
investor economy with an optimistic and a pessimistic investor. The dotted black lines in panels (a)
and (b) correspond to the stock price Spt and mean return µ
p
St in an economy with a single pessimistic
investor with a bias in beliefs −3.39%. The dashed black lines in panels (a) and (b) correspond to
the stock price Sot and mean return µ
o
St in an economy with a single optimistic investor with a bias
in beliefs 3.39%. The dotted black lines in panels (c) and (d) correspond to the stock volatility and
trading volume measure in an economy with a single investor. The dashed green lines in panels (c) and
(d) correspond to the stock volatility and trading volume measure in an economy with a one standard
deviation higher belief dispersion than the average. The other applicable parameter values are as in
Figure 1.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Main Model
Proof of Proposition 1: We proceed by first solving each θ-type investor’s problem, and
determining the equilibrium horizon prices and investors’ Lagrange multipliers, which are used
in the representative investor construction to infer her implied bias and to hence define the
average bias in beliefs, mt. We next identify the unique weights ht (θ) which along with the
average bias allow us to determine the belief dispersion, vt.
Dynamic market completeness implies a unique state price density process ξ under the true
measure P, such that the time-t value of a payoff XT at time T is given by Et [ξTXT ] /ξt, where
ξT/ξt represents the stochastic discount factor. Accordingly, the dynamic budget constraint (7)
of each θ-type investor under P can be restated as
Et [ξTWT (θ)] = ξtWt (θ) . (A1)
We also rewrite each θ-type investor’s expected utility function (6) under P as
E
[
ηT (θ)
WT (θ)
1−γ
1− γ
]
, (A2)
where ηT (θ) is the Radon-Nikody´m derivative of the subjective measure Pθ with respect to P,
ηT (θ) =
dPθ
dP
= e
θ
σ
ωT− 12 θ
2
σ2
T . (A3)
Maximizing each (distinct) θ-type investor’s expected objective function (A2) subject to (A1)
evaluated at time t = 0 leads to the optimal horizon wealth of each θ-type as
WT (θ) =
(
ηT (θ)
y (θ) ξT
) 1
γ
, (A4)
where the Lagrange multiplier y (θ) solves (A1) evaluated at time t = 0
y (θ)−
1
γ = E
[
ηT (θ)
1
γ ξ
1− 1
γ
T
]−1
ξ0S0√
2piv˜2
e−
1
2
(θ−m˜)2
v˜2 . (A5)
We next determine the time-T equilibrium state price density ξT . Substituting (A4) into
the market clearing condition
´
Θ
WT (θ) dθ = DT yields ξ
− 1
γ
T
´
Θ
y (θ)−
1
γ ηT (θ)
1
γ dθ = DT , which
after rearranging we obtain the time-T equilibrium state price density
ξT = D
−γ
T M
γ
T , (A6)
where the auxiliary process M and the likelihood ratio process η (θ) are given by
Mt ≡
ˆ
Θ
(
ηt (θ)
y (θ)
) 1
γ
dθ, ηt (θ) = Et [ηT (θ)] = e
θ
σ
ωt− 12 θ
2
σ2
t. (A7)
A1
As we show below, y (θ)−
1
γ is (scaled) Gaussian over the type space Θ for some mean αo,
variance β2o and a constant K:
y (θ)−
1
γ = K
1√
2piβ2o
e
− 1
2
(θ−αo)2
β2o . (A8)
Substituting ηt (θ) in (A7) along with (A8) into the definition of M in (A7) yields
Mt = K
ˆ
R
1√
2piβ2o
e
− 1
2
(θ−αo)2
β2o e
1
γ
θ
σ
ωt− 12 1γ θ
2
σ2
tdθ = K
βt
βo
e
− 1
2
α2o
β2o
+ 1
2
α2t
β2t , (A9)
where the last equality follows by completing the square and integrating, and the processes α
and β, with their initial values α0 = αo and β0 = βo, respectively, defined as
αt ≡ σ
σαo +
1
γ
β2oωt
σ2 + 1
γ
β2o t
, β2t ≡
β2oσ
2
σ2 + 1
γ
β2o t
. (A10)
We now verify y (θ)−
1
γ is as in (A8). Substituting (A6) into (A5) gives
y (θ)−
1
γ =
(
E
[
ηT (θ)
1
γ D1−γT M
γ−1
T
])−1 ξ0S0√
2piv˜2
e−
1
2
(θ−m˜)2
v˜2 , (A11)
where MT is equal to (A9) evaluated at time T . From Lemma A2 at the end of this appendix,
evaluated at t = 0, the expectation in (A11) is equal to
E
[
ηT (θ)
1
γ D1−γT M
γ−1
T
]
= ξ0S0K
−1
(
1√
2piβ2o
e
− 1
2
(θ−αo)2
β2o
)−1
1√
2piβ2oA
2
e
− 1
2
(θ−[αo−(1− 1γ )β2oT])
2
β2oA
2 ,
(A12)
where the constant A2 is given by A2 =
(
σ2 + 1
γ2
β2oT
)
/
(
σ2 + 1
γ
β2oT
)
. Substituting (A12) into
(A11) and manipulating terms yields (A8) with
αo = m˜+
(
1− 1
γ
)
β2oT, β
2
o =
(
γ
2
v˜2 − γ
2
2T
σ2
)
+
√(
γ
2
v˜2 − γ
2
2T
σ2
)2
+
γ2
T
v˜2σ2. (A13)
We note that when γ = 1 the constants αo and β
2
0 coincide with m˜ and v˜
2, respectively.
We now construct the representative investor in our dynamically complete market economy
to infer her implied bias in beliefs. The representative investor solves
U (DT ;λ) = max
ˆ
Θ
λ (θ) ηT (θ)
WT (θ)
1−γ
1− γ dθ, s.t.
ˆ
Θ
WT (θ) dθ = DT , (A14)
for some strictly positive weights λ (θ) for each θ-type investor, where the collection of weights
is denoted by λ = {λ (θ)}θ∈Θ. The first order conditions of (A14) yield
WT (θ)
WT (0)
=
(
λ (0) ηT (0)
λ (θ) ηT (θ)
)− 1
γ
,
where λ (0) and ηT (0) denote the 0-type investor’s weight and the Radon-Nikody´m derivative,
A2
respectively. Imposing
´
Θ
WT (θ) dθ = DT yields the equilibrium horizon wealth allocations as
WT (θ) =
[λ (θ) ηT (θ)]
1
γ´
Θ
[λ (θ) ηT (θ)]
1
γ dθ
DT . (A15)
Substituting (A15) into (A14) gives the representative investor’s utility function as
U (DT ;λ) =
´
Θ
[λ (θ) ηT (θ)] [λ (θ) ηT (θ)]
1−γ
γ dθ(´
Θ
[λ (θ) ηT (θ)]
1
γ dθ
)1−γ D1−γT1− γ , (A16)
which after rearranging becomes
U (DT ;λ) =
(ˆ
Θ
[λ (θ) ηT (θ)]
1
γ dθ
)γ
D1−γT
1− γ . (A17)
We next identify, from the second welfare theorem, the weights as λ (θ) = 1/y (θ) where y (θ)
is the θ-type investor’s Lagrange multiplier given by (A8). By substituting these weights into
(A17) we observe that the parenthesis term as MT in (A7). We define the martingale Z as the
conditional expectation of MγT under the true measure
Zt ≡ Et [MγT ] = Mγt
(
βT
βt
)γ−1
, (A18)
where the last equality above follows from Lemma A1 at the end of this appendix by taking
a = 0 and b = γ. Since equilibrium is unique up to a constant, without loss of generality we set
the constant K = (βT/βo)
1
γ
−1 in (A8) so that when substituted into (A18) we obtain Z0 = 1.
Applying Itoˆ’s Lemma to (A18) gives the dynamics of Z as
dZt
Zt
=
αt
σ
dωt. (A19)
Therefore, we obtain the representative investor’s utility function as
U (DT ;λ) = ZT
D1−γT
1− γ , (A20)
and identify ZT as being the Radon-Nikody´m derivative of the representative investor’s sub-
jective belief PR with respect to the true belief P, that is dPR/dP = ZT .28 Moreover, (A19)
implies that αt is the time-t (stochastic) bias of the representative investor, and so is the time-t
28Alternatively, we can derive the representative investor’s utility function in (A20) by applying Itoˆ’s Lemma
to Mγt using (A9) to obtain the dynamics dM
γ
t /M
γ
t = − 12 (1 − 1/γ)
(
β2t /σ
2
)
dt + (αt/σ) dωt. Since the drift
term is deterministic, we may write Mγt as M
γ
t = K
γYtZt where Y is a deterministic process and Z is a
martingale process with dynamics as in (A19) with initial values Y0 = Z0 = 1. The solution to Y is given by
Yt = (βt/βo)
γ−1
. Setting the constant as above K = (βT /βo)
(1/γ)−1
yields the representative investor’s utility
function as in (A20).
A3
average bias in beliefs, as denoted by mt,
mt = αt = σ
σαo +
1
γ
β2oωt
σ2 + 1
γ
β2o t
=
ˆ
Θ
θ
(
y (θ)−
1
γ ηt (θ)
1
γ´
Θ
y (θ)−
1
γ ηt (θ)
1
γ dθ
)
dθ. (A21)
Substituting σωt by lnDt −
(
µ− 1
2
σ2
)
t yields the expression stated in (10).
From the last equality in (A21) we identify the unique weights ht (θ) such that the weighted-
average of investors’ biases equals to the average bias in beliefs as
ht (θ) =
y (θ)−
1
γ ηt (θ)
1
γ´
Θ
y (θ)−
1
γ ηt (θ)
1
γ dθ
=
1√
2piβ2t
e
− 1
2
(θ−αt)2
β2t , (A22)
where the last equality follows from substituting ηt (θ) into (A7) and (A8) into (A22) and
rearranging where αt and βt are as in (A10).
Finally, to determine the belief dispersion, we use the definition in (9) with the average bias
in beliefs (A21) and weights (A22) substituted in to obtain
v2t =
ˆ
Θ
(θ −mt)2 ht (θ) dθ =
ˆ
Θ
(θ −mt)2 1√
2piβ2t
e
− 1
2
(θ−mt)2
β2t dθ = β2t . (A23)
By equating the initial values αo and β
2
o to m and v
2 in (A13) we obtain the (squared) dispersion
and the weights as in (10) and (12).
The condition for the property that a higher belief dispersion leads to a higher average bias
follows from the positivity of the partial derivative of (10) with respect to vt
∂
∂vt
mt =
(
lnDt −
(
m+ µ− 1
2
σ2
)
t
)
2
vt
γσ2
> 0. (A24)
Rearranging the term in the bracket gives the desired condition Dt > exp
(
m+ µ− 1
2
σ2
)
t.
Proof of Proposition 2: By no arbitrage, the stock price in our economy is given by
St =
1
ξt
Et [ξTDT ] . (A25)
To determine the stock price, we first compute the equilibrium state price density at time t by
using the fact that it is a martingale, ξt = Et [ξT ]. The equilibrium state price density at time
T is as in the proof of Proposition 1, given by (A6). Hence,
ξt = Et
[
D−γT M
γ
T
]
= D−γt M
γ
t
(
vT
vt
)γ−1
e−γ(µ−
1
2
σ2)(T−t)e−γmt(T−t)e
1
2
γ2σ2
v2t
v2
T
(T−t)
, (A26)
where the last equality follows from Lemma A1 by taking a = −γ and b = γ and using the
equalities mt = αt and vt = βt to express the equation in terms of model parameters.
Next, we substitute (A6) into (A25) and obtain the expectation Et [ξTDT ] = Et
[
D1−γT M
γ
T
]
.
A4
Again employing Lemma A1 with a = 1− γ and b = γ, we obtain
Et
[
D1−γT M
γ
T
]
= D1−γt M
γ
t
(
vT
vt
)γ−1
e(1−γ)(µ−
1
2
σ2)(T−t)e(1−γ)mt(T−t)e
1
2
(1−γ)2σ2 v
2
t
v2
T
(T−t)
. (A27)
Substituting (A26) and (A27) into (A25) and manipulating yields the stock price expression
(14) in Proposition 2. To determine the benchmark economy stock price, we set m˜ = v˜ = 0,
which yields mt = vt = 0. Substituting into (14) gives the benchmark stock price.
Property (i) that the stock price is convex in cash-flow news follows once we substitute (10)
into the stock price equation (14) and differentiate with respect to Dt.
The condition for property (ii) that the stock price is increasing in belief dispersion follows
from the partial derivative of (14) with respect to vt. This property holds when
∂
∂vt
mt >
1
2γ
(2γ − 1) (T − t) ∂
∂vt
v2t . (A28)
Taking the partial derivative of mt and v
2
t using the expression (10) while taking account of the
dependency on v and m, yields
∂
∂vt
mt =
2
vt
(mt − m˜) , ∂
∂vt
v2t = 2vt, (A29)
which after substituting into (A28) and rearranging gives the desired condition.
Finally, property (iii) that the stock price is increasing in investors’ risk aversion for relatively
bad cash-flow states and low values of γ follows from the partial derivative of (14) with respect
to γ. This property holds when
∂
∂γ
mt > σ
2 +
[
1
2γ2
v2t +
(
1− 1
2γ
)(
∂
∂γ
v2t
)]
(T − t) . (A30)
In this regard, using (11), we first compute ∂v2/∂γ and ∂m/∂γ, and to simplify notation denote
them by C and D, respectively
C ≡ ∂
∂γ
v2 =
(
v˜2
2
− γ
T
σ2
)
+
(
γ
2
v˜2 − γ2
2T
σ2
)(
v˜2
2
− γ
T
σ2
)
+ γ
T
v˜2σ2√(
γ
2
v˜2 − γ2
2T
σ2
)2
+ γ
2
T
v˜2σ2
, (A31)
D ≡ ∂
∂γ
m =
1
γ2
v2T +
(
1− 1
γ
)
CT. (A32)
Using the expressions in (10), we then obtain the required partial derivatives as
∂
∂γ
mt =
v2t
v2
[
D −
(
1
γ
− C
v2
)
(mt −m)
]
,
∂
∂γ
v2t =
v4t
v2
(
C
v2
+
v2t
σ2γ2
)
. (A33)
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Substituting (A33) into (A30) and rearranging yields the condition as
mt < m+
(
1
γ
− C
v2
)−1{
D − v
2
v2t
σ2 −
[
v2
2γ2
+
(
1− 1
2γ
)(
C
v2
+
v2t
σ2γ2
)
v2t
]
(T − t)
}
. (A34)
For any time t, the right hand side of (A34) is constant while its left hand side is the average
bias in beliefs, which is a normally distributed random variable, hence for sufficiently low levels
of mt (A34) always holds.
Proof of Proposition 3: Applying Itoˆ’s Lemma to the stock price (14) yields
dSt
St
=
[
γσ +
v2t
σ
(T − t)− mt
σ
] [
σ +
1
γ
v2t
σ
(T − t)
]
dt+
[
σ +
1
γ
v2t
σ
(T − t)
]
dωt, (A35)
where rearranging its drift term gives the equilibrium mean return as
µSt = γσ
2
(
1 +
1
γ
v2t
σ2
(T − t)
)2
−mt
(
1 +
1
γ
v2t
σ2
(T − t)
)
. (A36)
The benchmark economy mean return is obtained by setting mt = vt = 0 in (A36), which along
with (A36) gives (15).
The condition for property that the mean return is decreasing in belief dispersion follows
from the partial derivative of (15) with respect to vt. This property holds when
∂
∂vt
µSt = 2γσ
2
(
v2t
v2T
)
∂
∂vt
(
v2t
v2T
)
−mt ∂
∂vt
(
v2t
v2T
)
− v
2
t
v2T
∂
∂vt
mt < 0. (A37)
Substituting the partial derivatives (A29) into (A37) and using the equality
σ +
1
γ
v2t
σ
(T − t) = σ v
2
t
v2T
, (A38)
and rearranging gives the desired condition.
Finally, property (ii) that the mean return is decreasing in investors’ risk aversion for rela-
tively bad cash-flow news and low levels of risk aversion follows from the partial derivative of
(15) with respect to γ. This property holds when
∂
∂γ
µSt = σ
2
(
v2t
v2T
)2
+
[
2γσ2
(
v2t
v2T
)
−mt
](
∂
∂γ
v2t
v2T
)
− v
2
t
v2T
(
∂
∂γ
mt
)
< 0. (A39)
Substituting the partial derivatives (A33) into (A39) and using (A38) yields
∂
∂γ
µSt = σ
2
(
v2t
v2T
)2
+
[
2γσ2
(
v2t
v2T
)
−mt
]
E − v
2
t
v2T
v2t
v2
[
D −
(
1
γ
− C
v2
)
(mt −m)
]
, (A40)
where we have defined E as
E ≡ ∂
∂γ
v2t
v2T
= − 1
γ2
v2t
σ2
(T − t) + 1
γ
1
σ2
v4t
v2
(
C
v2
+
v2t
σ2γ2
)
(T − t) .
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Rearranging (A40) yields the condition as
mt <
[
v4t
v2T
(
1
γv2
− C
v4
)
− E
]−1{
v4t
v2T
[
D
v2
+
(
1
γ
− C
v2
)
m
v2
]
− σ2 v
4
t
v4T
− 2γσ2 v
2
t
v2T
E
}
. (A41)
We note that, for any time t, the right hand side of (A41) is a constant while its left hand
side is the average bias in beliefs, which is a normally distributed random variable, hence for
sufficiently low levels of mt (A41) always holds.
Proof of Proposition 4: The volatility of the stock is given by the diffusion term of the
dynamics (A35). The benchmark stock volatility readily is obtained by setting vt = 0 in the
diffusion term of (A35). The property that the stock volatility is increasing in belief dispersion
is immediate from (16).
Proof of Proposition 5: To compute the trading volume measure V , we proceed by first
determining the dynamics of each θ-type investor’s equilibrium wealth-share, W (θ) /S and
portfolio, φ (θ), the fraction of wealth invested in the stock. Then, applying the product rule
to ψ (θ) = φ (θ) (W (θ) /S), we obtain the dynamics of ψ (θ). Finally, using the definition in
(17) we obtain the trading volume measure V for the stock in closed form.
To compute each investor’s wealth share, we first consider her time-t wealth satisfying (A1)
ξtWt (θ) = Et [ξTWT (θ)] =
K√
2piv2
e−
1
2
(θ−m)2
v2 Et
[
ηT (θ)
1
γ D1−γT M
γ−1
T
]
, (A42)
where the second equality follows by substituting (A4), (A6) and (A8). We also employed the
equalities αo = m, β
2
o = v
2 (see, proof of Proposition 1) to express (A42) in terms of model
parameters. Using Lemma A2 with αt = mt, β
2
t = v
2
t substituted in, we have
Et
[
ηT (θ)
1
γ D1−γT M
γ−1
T
]
= ξtStK
−1
(
1√
2piv2
e−
1
2
(θ−m)2
v2
)−1
1√
2piv2tA
2
t
e
− 1
2
(θ−[mt−(1− 1γ )v2t (T−t)])
2
v2t A
2
t ,
(A43)
where A2t is as defined in (A60) with β
2
t = v
2
t , and mt and vt are as in (10). Substituting (A43)
into (A42) and rearranging gives the wealth-share of each θ-type investor as
Wt (θ)
St
=
1√
2piv2tA
2
t
e
− 1
2
(θ−[mt−(1− 1γ )v2t (T−t)])
2
v2t A
2
t . (A44)
We note that the time-t wealth-share distribution is Gaussian with mean and variance as
reported in (13) of Remark 1. We then apply Itoˆ’s lemma to (A44) to obtain the dynamics
d
Wt (θ)
St
= . . . dt+
Wt (θ)
St
v2t
γσv˜2t
(θ − m˜t) dωt. (A45)
To obtain each θ-type investor’s optimal portfolio φ (θ) as a fraction of wealth invested in
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the stock, we match the volatility term in (A45) with the corresponding one in
d
Wt (θ)
St
= . . . dt+
Wt (θ)
St
(φt (θ)− 1)σStdωt,
which is obtained by using (1) and (7). This yields investors’ equilibrium portfolios as
φt (θ) = 1 +
v2T
γσ2v˜2t
(θ − m˜t) . (A46)
We then apply the product rule to ψ (θ) = φ (θ) (W (θ) /S) using (A44) and (A46) to obtain
the portfolio dynamics in terms of number of shares invested in the stock ψ (θ)
dψt (θ) = . . . dt+
Wt (θ)
St
v2t
γσv˜2t
[
(θ − m˜t)φt (θ)− v
2
T
γσ2
]
dωt,
which after substituting (A46) yields the portfolio volatility of each θ-type investor σψ (θ) as
σψt (θ) =
Wt (θ)
St
v2t
γσv˜2t
[
v2T
γσ2
((
θ − m˜t
v˜t
)2
− 1
)
+ v˜t
(
θ − m˜t
v˜t
)]
. (A47)
We now compute our trading volume measure (17), obtained by summing the absolute value
of investors’ portfolio volatilities. To find this absolute value, we need to identify the types for
whom the portfolio volatility is negative at time t. From (A47), this occurs when the square
bracket term is negative which is a quadratic in types θ. Therefore at time-t, the types for
whom the portfolio volatility σψt (θ) is negative lies between two critical types θc1 and θc2 for
which σψt (θc1) = σψt (θc2) = 0. Solving the quadratic equation yields the critical types as
θc1 = m˜t + v˜t
(
−1
2
Xt − 1
2
√
X2t + 4
)
, θc2 = m˜t + v˜t
(
−1
2
Xt +
1
2
√
X2t + 4
)
, (A48)
where Xt = γσ
2v˜t/v
2
T . From definition (17), the trading volume measure is
Vt≡ 1
2
ˆ
Θ
|σψt (θ) |dθ= 1
2
[ˆ θc1
−∞
σψt (θ)dθ−
ˆ θc2
θc1
σψt (θ)dθ+
ˆ ∞
θc2
σψt (θ)dθ
]
=−
ˆ θc2
θc1
σψt (θ) dθ, (A49)
where the last equality follows from the fact
´
Θ
σψt (θ) dθ = 0. Substituting (A44) and (A47)
into (A49) yields
Vt = − v
2
t
γσv˜2t
ˆ θc2
θc1
[
v2T
γσ2
((
θ − m˜t
v˜t
)2
− 1
)
+ v˜t
(
θ − m˜t
v˜t
)]
1√
2piv˜2t
e
− 1
2
(θ−m˜t)2
v˜2t dθ.
Changing the variable of integration to z = θ−m˜t
v˜t
and using the facts that
ˆ (
z2 − 1) 1√
2pi
e−
1
2
z2dz = −zφ (z) + C, and
ˆ
z
1√
2pi
e−
1
2
z2dz = −φ (z) + C,
where φ (.) is the standard normal density function and C is a constant, we obtain the trading
A8
volume measure as
Vt=
v2t
γσv˜2t
[
v2T
γσ2
(
θc2−m˜t
v˜t
)
+v˜t
]
φ
(
θc2−m˜t
v˜t
)
− v
2
t
γσv˜2t
[
v2T
γσ2
(
θc1−m˜t
v˜t
)
+v˜t
]
φ
(
θc1−m˜t
v˜t
)
. (A50)
Finally, substituting (A48) into (A50) and rearranging gives (18).
The condition for property that the trading volume measure is increasing in belief dispersion
follows from the partial derivative of (18) with respect to vt, or equivalently v
2. To compute
this partial derivative we rewrite (18) compactly as
Vt =
1
2σ
[
Z+t φ
(
1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z−t
)
+ Z−t φ
(
1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z+t
)]
, (A51)
where we defined the positive deterministic processes
Z+t ≡
√(
σ2
X2t
v2t
v2T
)2
(X2t + 4) +
σ2
Xt
v2t
v2T
, Z−t ≡
√(
σ2
X2t
v2t
v2T
)2
(X2t + 4)−
σ2
Xt
v2t
v2T
,
with 0 < Z−t < Z
+
t , and
∂
∂v2
Z+t −
∂
∂v2
Z−t = 2
∂
∂v2
(
σ2
Xt
v2t
v2T
)
. (A52)
Substituting
∂
∂v2
φ
(
1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z−t
)
= −1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z−t φ
(
1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z−t
)
∂
∂v2
(
1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z−t
)
,
∂
∂v2
φ
(
1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z+t
)
= −1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z+t φ
(
1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z+t
)
∂
∂v2
(
1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z+t
)
,
with
∂
∂v2
(
1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z−t
)
=
1
2
[(
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
)
∂Z−t
∂v2
+ Z−t
∂
∂v2
(
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
)]
,
∂
∂v2
(
1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z+t
)
=
1
2
[(
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
)
∂Z+t
∂v2
+ Z+t
∂
∂v2
(
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
)]
,
into the partial derivative of (A51) with respect to v2, and using (A52) and the equality
Z+t Z
−
t = 4
(
σ2
X2t
v2t
v2T
)2
,
yields the required partial derivative
∂
∂v2
Vt =
1
2σ
[
2
∂
∂v2
(
σ2
Xt
v2t
v2T
)
− Z−t
σ2
X2t
v2t
v2T
∂
∂v2
(
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
)]
φ
(
1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z−t
)
+
1
2σ
[
−2 ∂
∂v2
(
σ2
Xt
v2t
v2T
)
− Z+t
σ2
X2t
v2t
v2T
∂
∂v2
(
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
)]
φ
(
1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z+t
)
. (A53)
However, (A53) is always positive because
∂
∂v2
(
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
)
< 0 and
∂
∂v2
(
σ2
Xt
v2t
v2T
)
> 0,
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which implies that the first square bracket term in (A53) is positive, and if the second square
bracket terms is also positive then it is easy to see that (A53) is positive. However, if the second
square bracket term is negative then we use the inequality
2
∂
∂v2
(
σ2
Xt
v2t
v2T
)
− Z−t
σ2
X2t
v2t
v2T
∂
∂v2
(
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
)
>
∣∣∣∣−2 ∂∂v2
(
σ2
Xt
v2t
v2T
)
− Z+t
σ2
X2t
v2t
v2T
∂
∂v2
(
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
)∣∣∣∣ ,
and the fact that
0 < φ
(
1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z+t
)
< φ
(
1
2
X2t
σ2
v2T
v2t
Z−t
)
, (A54)
to show that the first line in (A53) dominates the second line, and therefore (A53) is positive.
Property that the trading volume measure is positively related to the stock volatility follows
from the fact that an increase in belief dispersion leads to both a higher trading volume measure
and a stock volatility.
LEMMA A1: Let the processes M , α and β be defined as in (A9)–(A10). Then for all numbers
a and b we have
Et
[
DaTM
b
T
]
= DatM
b
t
(
βT
βt
)b
ea(µ−
1
2
σ2)(T−t)e
− b
2
α2t
β2t
(
1−β
2
T
β2t
[
1− b
γ
(
1−β
2
T
β2t
)]−1)
×
[
1− b
γ
(
1− β
2
T
β2t
)]− 1
2
e
1
2
[
1− b
γ
(
1−β
2
T
β2t
)]−1(
2abαt
γ
β2T
β2t
+a2σ2
)
(T−t)
, (A55)
provided 1− b
γ
(
1− β2T
β2t
)
> 0.
Proof of Lemma A1: By (A9), we have
MT = Mt
(
βT
βt
)
e
− 1
2
α2t
β2t
+ 1
2
α2T
β2
T , (A56)
and (A10) gives
α2T
β2T
= β2T
(
α2o
β4o
+ 2
αo
β2o
ωT
γσ
+
ω2T
γ2σ2
)
=
α2t
β2t
β2T
β2t
+ 2
αt
γσ
β2T
β2t
(ωT − ωt) + β
2
T
γ2σ2
(ωT − ωt)2 . (A57)
Substituting (A57) into (A56) and using the lognormality of DT , we obtain
Et
[
DaTM
b
T
]
= Dat e
a(µ− 12σ2)(T−t)M bt
(
βT
βt
)b
e
− b
2
α2t
β2t
(
1−β
2
T
β2t
)
Et
[
e
(
bαt
γσ
β2T
β2t
+aσ
)
(ωT−ωt)+ 12
bβ2T
γ2σ2
(ωT−ωt)2
]
.
(A58)
Since conditional on time-t information ωT − ωt ∼ N (0, T − t), we have
Et
[
e
(
bαt
γσ
β2T
β2t
+aσ
)
(ωT−ωt)+ 12
bβ2T
γ2σ2
(ωT−ωt)2
]
=
[
1− b
γ
(
1− β
2
T
β2t
)]− 1
2
e
1
2
[
1− b
γ
(
1−β
2
T
β2t
)]−1(
bαt
γσ
β2T
β2t
+aσ
)2
(T−t)
,
which after substituting into (A58) and rearranging gives (A55).
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LEMMA A2: Let the processes η (θ) and M be as in (A7) and (A9), respectively. Then
Et
[
ηT (θ)
1
γ D1−γT M
γ−1
T
]
= ξtStK
−1
(
1√
2piβ2o
e
− 1
2
(θ−αo)2
β2o
)−1
1√
2piβ2tA
2
t
e
− 1
2
(θ−[αt−(1− 1γ )β2t (T−t)])
2
β2t A
2
t ,
(A59)
where the positive deterministic process A2 is given by
A2t =
1
γ
+
(
1− 1
γ
)
β2T
β2t
. (A60)
Proof of Lemma A2: Using (A3) and the lognormality of DT , we have
ηT (θ)
1
γ = e
− θ
γσ2
(µ− 12σ2)T− 12γ θ
2
σ2
T
D
θ
γσ2
T .
Therefore, the required expectation becomes
Et
[
ηT (θ)
1
γ D1−γT M
γ−1
T
]
= e
− θ
γσ2
(µ− 12σ2)T− 12γ θ
2
σ2
TEt
[
D
1−γ+ θ
γσ2
T M
γ−1
T
]
. (A61)
Letting a = 1− γ + θ
γσ2
and b = γ − 1 in Lemma A1 yields
Et
[
D
1−γ+ θ
γσ2
T M
γ−1
T
]
= D
1−γ+ θ
γσ2
t M
γ−1
t
1
At
(
βT
βt
)(γ−1)
e
(
1−γ+ θ
γσ2
)
(µ− 12σ2)(T−t)e
− γ−1
2
α2t
β2t
(
1−β
2
T
β2t
1
A2t
)
×e
αt
A2t
(1− 1γ )
(
1−γ+ θ
γσ2
)
β2T
β2t
(T−t)
e
1
2
1
A2t
(
1−γ+ θ
γσ2
)2
σ2(T−t)
, (A62)
where the deterministic positive process A2t as in (A60). Substituting the equality
D
θ
γσ2
t = e
θ
γσ2
(µ− 12σ2)t+θ
(
αt
β2t
−αo
β2o
)
,
and (A62) into (A61) and rearranging leads to
Et
[
ηT (θ)
1
γ D1−γT M
γ−1
T
]
= D1−γt M
γ−1
t
1
At
(
βT
βt
)(γ−1)
e(1−γ)(µ−
1
2
σ2)(T−t)
×e− 12 θ
2
γσ2
T
e
θ
(
αt
β2t
−αo
β2o
)
e
− γ−1
2
α2t
β2t
(
1−β
2
T
β2t
1
A2t
)
×e
αt
A2t
(1− 1γ )
(
1−γ+ θ
γσ2
)
β2T
β2t
(T−t)
e
1
2
1
A2t
(
1−γ+ θ
γσ2
)2
σ2(T−t)
. (A63)
We then substitute
ξtSt = Et
[
D1−γT M
γ
T
]
= D1−γt M
γ
t
(
βT
βt
)γ−1
e(1−γ)(µ−
1
2
σ2)(T−t)e(1−γ)αt(T−t)e
1
2
(1−γ)2σ2 β
2
t
β2
T
(T−t)
,
and the equalities
1− β
2
T
β2t
1
A2t
=
1
A2t
β2T
γ2σ2
(T − t) , and
(
1− 1
γ
)
β2T
γσ2
(T − t) = 1− A2t ,
A11
along with (A9) into (A63) to obtain
Et
[
ηT (θ)
1
γ D1−γT M
γ−1
T
]
= ξtStK
−1
(
1√
2piβ2o
e
− 1
2
(θ−αo)2
β2o
)−1
1√
2piβ2tA
2
t
×e−
1
2
(θ−αo)2
β2o e
1
2
α2o
β2o
− 1
2
α2t
β2t e(γ−1)αt(T−t)e
− 1
2
(1−γ)2σ2 β
2
t
β2
T
(T−t)
e
− 1
2
θ2
γσ2
T
e
θ
(
αt
β2t
−αo
β2o
)
×e−
γ−1
2
α2t
β2t
1
A2t
β2T
γ2σ2
(T−t)
e
αt
A2t
(
1−γ+ θ
γσ2
)
γσ2
β2t
(1−A2t)
e
1
2
1
A2t
(
1−γ+ θ
γσ2
)2
σ2(T−t)
.
We note that the last two rows in the above equation is equal to
e
− 1
2
(θ−[αt−(1− 1γ )β2t (T−t)])
2
β2t A
2
t ,
and so we obtain (A59).
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Appendix B. Parameter Values
In this Appendix, we determine the parameter values employed in our Figures by matching
the model implied belief dispersion moments to the corresponding summary statistics in Yu
(2011), who reports for a typical stock, a time-average dispersion value of 3.23%, a standard
deviation of 0.38%, minimum of 2.70% and maximum of 4.42% for the sample period of 1981
to 2005.29 We take our stock as the typical stock with an average belief dispersion, and match
its implied time-average and minimum dispersion values to the corresponding reported ones
for the typical stock, 3.23% and 2.70% respectively.30 Towards this, we begin by deriving the
time-average squared dispersion, denoted by v˙2, in terms of its initial dispersion v and the
quantity γσ2/T in closed-form as
v˙2 =
1
T
ˆ T
0
v2t dt =
1
T
ˆ T
0
v2σ2
σ2 + 1
γ
v2t
dt =
γσ2
T
ln
(
1 +
v2
γσ2/T
)
, (B1)
and match it to the reported squared average dispersion, v˙2 = (3.23%)2. We then rearrange
the dispersion equation in (10) to obtain an expression for the minimum dispersion vT , again
in terms of v an γσ2/T as
1
v2T
=
1
v2
+
1
γσ2/T
. (B2)
Matching vT = 2.70% in (B2) and substituting it into (B1) and numerically solving the non-
linear equation with one unknown yields the relation γσ2/T = 0.00136285. Next, we set the
relative risk aversion coefficient of investors as γ = 2 and the horizon T = 10 years, and
substitute these into the previous relation to back out σ = 8.25%.31 The standard deviation
of investor types, v˜, is then obtained by first backing out the initial dispersion v from (B2)
and then using the relation between v and v˜ (11), yielding v˜ = 3.39%. To plot the effects
of higher belief dispersion from its average value, the standard deviation of investor types is
29We use the summary statistics in Yu (2011) because the dispersion measure he constructs for the typical
stock is the value-weighted average of individual stock dispersion levels reported in the I/B/E/S summary
database, which in turn is constructed as the standard deviation of analyst forecasts about the long-term
earnings growth rates. This construction is closest to our dispersion measure as also discussed in footnote 6 in
Section II.
30For simplicity, we obtain the time-average dispersion by taking the square root of the time-average squared
dispersion, (1/T )
´ T
0
v2t dt rather than the time-average dispersion (1/T )
´ T
0
vtdt, which differs from the former
due to Jensen’s inequality. However, the quantitative differences between these two measures are insignificant
in our calibration since the reported belief dispersion is only a few percentage points in the data. On the other
hand, using the minimum rather than the maximum dispersion value for calibration ensures that the dispersion
values in our model remain within the corresponding reported range in Yu (2011) which is not guaranteed for
the alternative choice of maximum dispersion.
31Other works in this literature use similar relative risk aversion coefficient values in their calibration, including
Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin (2013) (γ = 2), and Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), Dumas, Lewis, and
Osambela (2017) (γ = 3). Our choice of the horizon value T = 10 is chosen so that we obtain plausible decay
rate for the belief dispersion in our model.
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set so that the time-average dispersion v˙ is one standard deviation higher than its average
value, 3.23% + 0.38% = 3.61%, yielding the value 3.94% for the standard deviation of investor
types. The mean of investor types m˜ is taken to be 0 to give equal initial weights to optimistic
and pessimistic views on them. We set the true mean growth rate of the expected payoff as
the reported average forecast of the long-term earnings-per-share growth rate of 14.23% in Yu
(2011).32 In addition to the model parameters above, we also choose the current time t to
evaluate the effects of belief dispersion in our model so that at that time the belief dispersion is
equal to its time-average value, vt = v˙ = 3.23%. Backing out t from the dispersion expression
in (10) yields t = 4.37, which is roughly the mid-point given the horizon value T = 10 in our
calibration as often used in other works (e.g., Pa´stor and Veronesi (2012)). This procedure
yields the parameter values in Table BI.33 We would like to highlight that the behavior of
our equilibrium quantities as depicted in our Figures is typical and does not vary much with
alternative plausible values of parameters.
[INSERT TABLE BI HERE ]
32Even though the value for µ may appear large, our plots do not vary much for smaller alternative values
for µ since our key quantities, the average bias and dispersion of beliefs are insensitive to it.
33The parameter values for the multiple stocks economy of Section V can be determined in a similar fashion.
For instance, one can set stock 1 as the typical stock with an average belief dispersion, and stock 2 as an
otherwise identical stock but with a (one standard deviation) higher dispersion, as discussed above.
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Name Symbol Value
Mean of investor types m˜ 0
Standard deviation of investor types v˜ 3.39%
Mean growth rate of the expected payoff µ 14.23%
Uncertainty about the payoff σ 8.25%
Investors’ relative risk aversion coefficient γ 2
Horizon T 10
Current time t 4.37
Table BI: Parameter values. This table reports the parameter values used in our main model.
The derivation of these values is presented in the text.
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